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ABSTRACT 
 
TAX CHANGES IN VERY DIFFERENT ECONOMIES 
 
By 
 
JEFFREY THOMAS CONDON 
 
August 2014 
 
  
Committee Chair: Dr. Andrew Feltenstein  
  
Major Department: Economics  
 
  
 Despite the prevalence of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models applied to tax 
changes of varying types, little work has been done focusing on state level comprehensive tax 
reform or on tax reform in countries undergoing a regime change. This research develops and 
applies methodologies for analyzing fiscal policy changes under these two very different 
economic scenarios. The findings for each application are relevant to policy makers as they 
weigh the effects of tax reform. The models developed for the two scenarios offer guidance to 
future modelers in studying similar economies and the contrast of the two provides a 
framework for thinking about model design and application. Finally, the results, when 
compared to each other, allow us to see the relative effectiveness of the two tax reform 
policies given their very different economies. 
 A method for extending Lofgren’s 2002 standard CGE model for developing countries is 
developed to analyze state personal and corporate income taxes, sales taxes, and taxes on 
intermediate goods.  This extension is then used to study comprehensive state level tax reform 
in Georgia.  The model is run in GAMS using 2010 IMPLAN data with industries aggregated 
specifically for the tax reforms. The tax reforms analyzed include and shift from the income tax 
to the sales tax as considered by the Georgia legislature in 2011 as well as an extension of that 
policy which totally replaces the income tax with a sales tax. Results are reported for short and 
long run effects on gross state product, consumer income and equivalent variation, industrial 
output, and the state’s budget. 
A model containing tax evasion and tax avoidance behavior is developed and applied to 
Egypt in which the economic effects of the regime change are simulated within the duration of 
the dynamic model.  The model is run using 2008 data from the Egyptian Central Bank and 
includes an exogenous shift in foreign demand for Egyptian exports to simulate the effects of 
the regime change. Results are presented for the growth paths and end states for consumer 
income and welfare, gross domestic product, inflation, and tax evasion. 
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CHAPTER ONE: COMPARISON OF METHODOLOGIES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the advent of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE), the models have been 
modified and adapted to study numerous alternative policy treatments. In addition to the 
expanded capabilities of the models themselves, there has been a dramatic increase in the 
amount of resources given to the collection of data required for these models.  With 
increasingly detailed datasets and new and interesting applications created each year, there are 
many opportunities for previously unexplored policy analyses. This dissertation considers the 
use of CGE models to analyze fiscal policy changes in two regions with very different economies. 
Focusing on fiscal policy, we have a wide spectrum of regional or policy applications 
available to us. Taxation and government expenditure analyses using CGE have been conducted 
across the globe for years. In each case, the model’s general design must be modified according 
to the level of regional fiscal control, monetary control, and trading partners, calibrated to the 
state of the economy, and must take into account any exogenous factors that are essential to 
the model. In this research, we look at two extreme ends of the spectrum: the state of Georgia 
within the United States of American (USA) and the nation of Egypt.   
These two economies present an interesting contrast of CGE application as they are so 
drastically different in a few interesting ways. Georgia operates within the USA’s currency while 
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Egypt, as a sovereign nation, controls its monetary policy. The USA--and as a result Georgia--has 
free trade within the nation and federal control of its policies regarding trade are above 
Georgia’s level of control, while Egypt has unilateral control of its trade policy. Georgia’s tax 
structure represents a relatively modest portion of the total fiscal picture, as federal and local 
taxes are not under its control, while Egypt is a single fiscal zone. Georgia’s economy is stable 
within the business cycle, while Egypt has suffered the consequences of a political revolution 
and regime change with dramatic impacts on its trade, currency, and largest industries.  
The purpose of this research is to explore the application of CGE methodology in fiscal 
policy analysis as applied to the subtle changes resulting from modest revenue neutral changes 
of a currency within a region and a free trade zone, and then compare that approach to a 
model that assumes a large exogenous change to a country. This chapter will look at the 
contrasting specifications required in the Georgia and Egypt models. Because we are focusing 
on fiscal policy in a CGE framework, this chapter will begin by comparing and contrasting the 
complexities of CGE modeling in these two different economies.  Chapter Two of this 
dissertation will present a subnational model of tax reform for the state of Georgia. Chapter 
Three will present a national model for Egypt, evaluating alternative fiscal policies to address 
the exogenous effects of the revolution.  Chapter Four contains conclusions.  
 
  
  3  
 
II. CONTRASTING MODEL DESIGNS 
 
Chapters Two and Three detail each model’s specifications and the methodology used 
for evaluating the treatments. They also present background information about the status of 
the economies and supporting empirical literature for similar models. Before presenting the 
methodology in its entirety we address the two models generally, to note important differences 
in what is required in each case, and provide some useful background.  
The Georgia analysis is a static simulation of a tax reform package for which the defining 
characteristic is a decrease in the income tax, with a corresponding expansion of the sales tax 
to previously untaxed sectors, thus maintaining revenue neutrality.  In Georgia, the purpose of 
the analysis is to predict the effects of the policy on welfare and output.  In Egypt, the analysis 
is sequentially dynamic, incorporating an informal sector, with an exogenous shift of foreign 
demand to simulate the political revolution, and the treatment is a hypothetical fiscal policy 
response. The purpose of the Egyptian analysis is not to predict the future state of the Egyptian 
economy or of the Egyptian people, but rather to compare the relative effects of alternative 
policies in the extreme conditions of the post-revolution economy.   
 In any model, the designer must consider the relevant policy levers available to policy 
makers, the important economic indicators used for policy evaluation, as well as the direct 
effects of any exogenous changes in the model.  Regarding policy levers in Georgia, we first 
consider the initial tax structure and proposed reforms.  The initial tax structure varies from the  
reformed tax structure only with regard to the rates and their application in untaxed sectors, so 
this implementation is limited only by the availability of industry and household data.  
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Furthermore, Georgia does not have control of its trade or monetary policy, so those policy 
levers are not of interest in this instance. Regarding Egypt, the nation has complete control of 
its fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, as long as its trading partners and lenders are modeled 
realistically so as to avoid corner solutions. In Egypt’s case, we will have to pay close attention 
to each decision, allowing the model to simulate the widest array of fiscal policy changes and 
monetary shifts, as well as consequences of the revolution.   
 In Georgia, we are interested in the economic indicators affected by tax reform.  Thus, 
we maintain endogeneity for variables of interest such as household utility, industry output, 
gross domestic output of the state, and prices.  To keep to a square system of equations, some 
conditions must be imposed on any model.  In Georgia, for example, we maintain a balanced 
budget so that government expenditures are allocated according to the previously observed 
shares of the budget and exactly equal to the tax revenue generated by the model.  In Egypt, 
we are interested in macroeconomic indicators for purposes of policy evaluation, but we also 
consider which variables are exogenously shifted to simulate the revolution.  In this case we 
look at indicators such as the budget deficit, currency flows, GDP, household utility, and prices.  
We will look at endogenous macroeconomic variables after we exogenously adjust taxes.  We 
also can maintain control of variables hit hardest by the revolution, including foreign demand 
for Egyptian exports such as tourism, or foreign direct investment, or the interest rate on 
government debt.   
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A. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Control 
 
CGE models are powerful tools for analyzing policy changes under the weakest ceteris 
paribus conditions. However, when designing the model, we must isolate the policy 
instruments available to policy makers according to their level of control. Generally, we can 
separate these into three different classifications: control of both fiscal and monetary policy; 
control only of fiscal policy; and control only of monetary policy.  All countries with their own 
currency fall into the first category where they control both fiscal and monetary policy.  
Subnational regions that wield fiscal authority have control of their regional fiscal policy, with 
some constraints, but do not have control of their monetary policy.  Examples include states or 
cities within the United States, or countries within the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe, 
or countries that have dollarized, such as Panama.  The final of the three categories applies only 
to the European Monetary Union, as it has control of monetary policy for its region, but no 
direct control of the fiscal policy of its members. The structure of the CGE model varies greatly 
depending on the level of fiscal and monetary control. 
For regions with control of their monetary policy, the model’s design must align with the 
currency policy of the region. For countries with a floating exchange rate, we allow relative 
values of currency to adjust endogenously, so that we can monitor the effects on the currency 
in the simulation.  For countries with a fixed exchange rate, we can hold constant the relative 
values of currency, and see the effects on reserves in the central banks. In the case of Egypt,  
where the exchange rate floats within a narrow range, we have chosen to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate so that we can control it both before and after the regime change. Had the 
  6  
 
exchange rate encountered drastic swings during the revolution, adjustment of this variable 
would have been possible. Regardless, this approach allows us to allocate foreign aid to 
simulate the Egyptian Central Bank’s defense of the currency.   
Within the USA, and in the state of Georgia, we maintain the same currency for all 
goods by allowing borrowing and savings between states to adjust and account for terms of 
trade between the states. This procedure essentially gives us a fixed exchange rate between 
Georgia and the rest of the USA. A similar procedure is done regarding the borrowing and 
savings from the foreign sector as the effect of the revenue neutral tax change in Georgia has a 
negligible effect on the value of the US dollar. 
 Regarding tax changes, Egypt is the simpler of the two as it is a single fiscal zone. 
Changes within the Egyptian model are simply introduced for the country and applied using 
constraints. Georgia, however, requires separation of the federal and local taxes in the social 
accounting matrix (SAM), so that state level tax changes are not applied to federal or local tax 
codes. This is a straightforward procedure that is considered when the structure of the SAM is 
established.  
 
B. Trade 
 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are frequently used for analysis of 
unilateral trade reforms, multilateral tariff and quota reforms, and regional free trade 
agreements. CGE models are capable of identifying the subsets of each regional economy that  
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will be helped or hurt by trade reform. As with production technology and consumption 
preferences, trade data is retrieved from the social accounting matrix (SAM).  Trade specific 
models, depending on the structure, require trading partner specific data on import and export 
tariffs and quotas, freight-on-board prices, transportation costs, and economic distance. When 
regional SAM data is denominated in different currencies, nominal exchange rates are required. 
This nominal rate is used to calculate the real exchange rate, which is the ratio of the prices of 
traded goods to non-traded goods. The nominal rate can be flexible, fixed, or stochastic, 
depending upon the context. In models that incorporate trade but for which trade is not the 
primary point of interest, the nominal exchange rate is flexible and allowed to fluctuate to 
permit for a fixed current account balance. This closure rule, an exogenous current account and 
endogenous nominal exchange rate, applies to most countries, but this too can be adjusted 
depending upon the context. 
An additional factor to consider when looking at trade is the relative importance of the 
trading regions. If a region is of insufficient size to impact global prices, modelers usually allow 
world prices to remain fixed regardless of changes in the small country. However, if trade is  
modeled using an Armington import function, each country is a monopoly provider of its goods. 
If Armington elasticities are set incorrectly, unrealistically large swings in prices and exchange 
rates can occur regardless of the size of the country. Furthermore, if the substitutability of 
goods is parameterized incorrectly, these price swings can generate unrealistic production or 
consumption decisions. 
In our Georgia model, we allow the state of Georgia to be the monopoly provider of 
differentiated goods and services to its trading partners: the rest of the United States (RUS) and 
  8  
 
the rest of the world (ROW). For both the RUS and the ROW, we maintain a stable currency and 
allow foreign savings and investment and the current account to fluctuate. This is appropriate 
in Georgia, as the fluctuations have a negligible effect.  Its largest trading partner is the RUS, 
which uses the dollar, and that dollar is nearly unaltered by the new flow of goods and services 
in response to the tax change in Georgia.   
In Egypt, we model a single trading partner—the ROW—in a simple export equation in 
which aggregate demand for exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices as 
well as world income. Thus, the combination of the export equation and domestic supply 
responses determines aggregate exports. Demand for imports is endogenous and is derived 
from the domestic consumers' maximization problems. Foreign lending is assumed to be 
exogenous. Thus, gross capital inflows are exogenous, but the overall change in reserves is 
endogenous with a fixed exchange rate. 
 
C. Economic Stability 
 
 We say the economy is stable when there are no fundamental changes in the nature of 
the economy during the time period covered by the calibration and simulations.  Descriptions 
of the Georgian and Egyptian economies as well as the calibration and simulation of the models 
are explained in detail in Chapters Two and Three.  For now, suffice it to say that the 
fundamental structure of the economy as represented by Georgia’s SAM is unchanged for the 
duration of the simulation, while Egypt’s SAM is fundamentally altered within the model’s 
duration by the regime change.   
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 In the case of the stable Georgia economy, we are interested in the effects of the tax 
change, so that change in Georgia is the cause of the effects we are interested in studying. Thus, 
we calibrate the model of Georgia to the pre-change equilibrium, institute the change, and then 
look at the differences.  This is the most common application of CGE models. 
 In Egypt, the revolution is a known confounding change we must account for in the 
calibration. In this situation, we calibrate our model using a pre-revolution SAM so that it 
simulates the pre-revolution economy. Without an exogenous intervention, the model would 
simply simulate the economy as it would have existed in the absence of the revolution. To avoid 
this, we use a sequentially dynamic model calibrated to the economy as it existed when the 
SAM was established, and then adjust exogenous variables to simulate the macroeconomic 
effects of the regime change.  This calibration is considerably more difficult than the case of  
Georgia, as we are calibrating the model, first to the economy that spawned the SAM, but then 
again to a similar yet new post-revolution economy.  Finally, with a fully calibrated model, we 
then simulate treatments for comparison. 
 Another alternative is available and is used by modelers who do not know the stability 
of the economy with certainty.  A modeler may allow for stochastic changes to parameters.  
This application of CGE models, first used by Kydland and Prescott, is called dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) modeling (1982). In a DSGE, the modeler addresses the Lucas 
critique by allowing some parameters such as technology, prices, preferences, or government 
policies to adjust randomly (1976).  This approach can incorporate more sophisticated 
assumptions about the rationality of institutions.  For example, a consumer’s consumption and 
savings decisions in the present depend upon his/her rational expectations about the real 
  10  
 
interest rate, and that real interest rate is heavily affected by the stochastically determined 
future nominal interest rate. In this example, we see the relationship between the expectations 
of the consumer, the volatility of interest rates, and economic performance. This inclusion of 
expectations has led many central banks to use DSGE models to study monetary policy. Another 
feature of this approach is that it can incorporate stickiness in parameter adjustments. For 
example, one might use a DSGE model to study the different effects of volatile inflation on 
industries whose prices vary with respect to their flexibility or stickiness.  
 
D. Closure Rules  
 
Closure rules refer to the modeler’s decisions about which variables are endogenous and which 
variables are exogenous. This is necessary to maintain a square system in which the number of 
unknowns does not exceed the number of equations thus allowing for mathematical 
techniques to solve the system of equations. Closure rules are generally divided into two 
categories: micro and macro. Micro closure rules refer to the mechanisms by which individual 
markets adjust to reach equilibrium. Sen (1963) notes that the system of equations is over-
determined if we impose the following: fixed investment, consumption is determined by 
income; prices equal their marginal product; and factor supply equals factor demand. To avoid 
the over-determined system, we must make some assumptions about the mechanisms. To 
illustrate micro closure rules, it is useful to look at a single market. In the labor market, for 
example, two common closure rules are neoclassical and Keynesian. Under a neoclassical  
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closure rule, labor supply is the exogenous variable, while the endogenous wage variable 
adjusts until supply and demand equal. Under the Keynesian closure rule, the (sticky) wage is 
the exogenous variable, and the endogenous labor supply variable adjusts until supply and 
demand equal. In this example, it is easy to see that the choice of closure rule can have a 
significant effect on the results of the model. There are other configurations of labor market 
closure rules such as Kaldorian, which allows the wage rate to deviate from the marginal 
product of labor, and Johansen, which adjusts residual consumption to obtain labor market  
equilibrium. One should choose the closure rule based on the economy and the market 
structures being modeled because each of these may alter the resulting equilibrium depending 
upon regional and sectoral factor mobility, the relationship between savings and investment, or 
other factor market traits (Dewatripont and Michel, 1987).  
In addition to the micro closure rules of the factor markets, a modeler must choose 
macro closure rules. Macro closure rules refer to the savings-investment balance, the 
government budget balance, and the trade balance. In each case a modeler must assign 
exogeneity or endogeneity. For example, investments are either endogenous and savings 
driven or savings can accommodate an exogenously fixed level of investments. Models 
frequently have balanced budget conditions on government so that expenditure equals 
revenue, but an alternative to that approach allows for the government to access capital 
markets to cover a deficit.  Yet another way to approach the government balance is to allow 
some tax instrument to adjust endogenously to maintain an exogenous government budget.  
Regarding trade closure in a multiregional model, the trading partners each have their own 
SAM, so their behavior is modeled with their own micro closure rules.  In a model with a single 
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region we use that region’s SAM with import and export flows to complete the model. In either 
case, one must accommodate for changes in the relative value of currencies and foreign savings 
such that one adjusts to clear the current account of the balance of payments. This is frequently 
done with the ROW reacting to the regions with SAMs to borrow or loan, consume or provide, 
and appreciate or depreciate as needed to close the model. There is no ‘correct’ closure rule: a  
structuralist may use Keynesian rules, while a neoclassical economist may use a price-
adjusting closure rule. The choice is up to the modeler’s judgment as to what most accurately 
represents the economy (see Robinson and Lofgren, 2005). 
In Georgia we vary the closure rules to simulate the effects of the policy change 
depending upon the treatment of factors. This approach allows us to use a static model to draw 
conclusions about the long run and the short run. We vary labor market and capital market 
closures by adjusting the supply of either factor and the specificity of capital.  In the variation 
simulating the shortest run, we set capital to be activity specific with a fixed supply, and set a 
fixed supply of labor. In the short run simulation, the supply of both factors remains fixed, but 
capital is mobile. In the long run simulation, both capital and labor are mobile and the supply of 
each is variable. Regarding macro closures, we let the government expenditure equal 
government revenue with an exogenous tax structure, investment adjusts to accommodate 
savings, and both the RUS and ROW savings adjust to accommodate a fixed exchange rate.  The 
first macro closure is crucial as it allows us to control the tax rates. The remaining two rules 
have little impact on the simulation results, as the effect of the policy change on these variables 
is minimal.   
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 In the Egyptian model, capital is sector specific while labor is mobile between sectors 
and thus the supply is variable.  The supply of sector capital in period two is determined by 
sector savings in period one. This calculation of the endogenous savings variable is explained in 
Chapter Three. Egypt’s government may run a deficit which is financed through monetary  
expansion or borrowing. The ROW is modeled as a single trading partner whose consumption of 
Egyptian goods adjusts to accommodate domestic supply and whose supply of foreign goods to 
Egypt adjusts to accommodate domestic consumption. The balance of payments is kept 
through adjustments to the endogenous central bank reserves.   
 
III. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
A. State Level Literature 
 
 For the first time, both state level data and software capable of computing the 
numerical solutions of CGE models were widely available in the late 1980s.  IMPLAN, a private 
data provider, began publishing I-O matrices in 1988, and General Algebraic Modeling Software 
(GAMS) made programming and solving these problems possible outside of the base 
programming languages such as Fortran or COBAL.  This led to early models of Oklahoma (Koh, 
1991), Southern California (Robinson, Subramanian, and Geoghegan, 1993), and Ohio (Kraybill 
and Pai, 1995).  Koh’s model looked at the Oklahoma’s ‘boom and bust’ cycle from 1977 to 
1986. Robinson, Subramanian, and Geoghegan looked at air pollution in the LA basin.   Kraybill 
  14  
 
and Pai developed the model to look at infrastructure, but their two-factor model served as a 
platform for follow-up papers on tax incentives and public goods (see Seung and Kraybill, 1999,  
2001).  Another early model is the Oklahoma model by Vargas, Eliecer, and Schreiner (1999) 
which treats the factor market for wood as a monopsony.  This extensively documented model 
has been used in numerous follow-up papers on such topics as oligopsonies and sport fishing.   
In 2002, Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson, through the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), published a standard model along with a detailed model description and its 
accompanying code in GAMS. Lofgren also developed a series of CGE exercises in GAMS to 
familiarize new modelers with GAMS. As a result of Lofgren’s extensive documentation and 
GAMS coding exercises, numerous researchers use this as a base.  The IFPRI model has been 
modified and used for hundreds of CGE applications. For example, the IFPRI model was adapted 
for regional modeling by Holland, Stodick, and Devadoss and applied to the economic effects of 
Mad Cow Disease in Washington (2004). In this iteration, the code modifications and additional 
details regarding the new model design were published for others to build on. This process of 
modifying the existing model for other purposes and publishing the documentation continues 
today (See Watson et al., 2012). The Lofgren model, while the most popular, is not unique. 
Similar detailed documentation and code is available for more than 40 different models within 
GAMS alone. The wide distribution of so many resources has made CGE models significantly 
more accessible for researchers. The result is that their use has spread, and today it is used to 
model almost anything that can be modeled, from fisheries in Alaska (Seung and Waters, 2010) 
to the economic impacts of forest bioenergy in Florida (Huang et al., 2012). 
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Despite their increased use for various academic purposes, academics represent a small 
portion of the state analysis that takes place when proposed policies are being evaluated.  
Berck, Golan, and Smith (1996) built the California Dynamic Revenue Analysis Model (DRAM) to 
fulfill the state government’s requirement that all tax changes be dynamically scored. The 
model ran three hypothetical scenarios, found relatively modest deviations from static methods, 
was defunded in 2000 without having simulated any real policies, and is now used by 
California’s Air Resource Board to study the environment (Vasche, 2006).  Massachusetts also 
developed a sophisticated model in cooperation with REMI, a private company.  REMI operates 
it today and has numerous states and cities as clients.  IMPLAN, the provider of the I-O matrices 
in every state-level paper mentioned above, does policy evaluation for every level of regional 
aggregation down to the single county. These private firms conduct a significant share of the 
modeling for which there is funding available.  
 Despite their small market share, academics continue to apply CGE models to study 
state tax issues. Morgan, Mutti, and Partridge (1989) studied the long-run impact of local, state, 
and federal taxes on factor allocation.  They found that unilateral removal of distorting taxes 
led to higher growth in the region and inflows of capital and labor. Waters, Holland, and Weber 
(1997)1 examined the impact of Oregon’s “Measure 5,” a property tax limit passed in 1990.  
They find that output and income increased after the limitation was passed, and high income 
households benefited more than low income households while state and local government 
                                                     
1
 To illustrate the repeated modifications to existing models: the Waters, Holland, and Weber model was built 
using some early GAMS code by Krybill and Pai. The Julia-Wise, Cooke, and Holland model was built using the 
Waters, Holland, and Weber model’s treatment of the property tax. The Faulk, Thaiprasert, and Hicks model was 
built using the Holland, Stodick, and Devadoss model.  
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expenditures and revenues decreased substantially. Julia-Wise, Cooke, and Holland also looked 
at property taxes by modeling a 50% cut to property taxes in Idaho (2002).  Their study found 
that $2 of tax revenue would be lost for every $3 of property tax reduction, with a significantly 
regressive distribution of the benefits.  Edmiston (2002) used a CGE model to simulate the 
strategic apportionment of state corporate income taxes.  She finds that the first mover has 
significant budgetary gains by strategic apportionment, but after neighboring states respond, 
the effects are diminished.  However, the economic development gains remain.  Dakhlia and 
Strauss (2003) looked at sales and use taxes in e-commerce between Washington and Oregon.  
They find the classic beggar-thy-neighbor results. Faulk, Thaiprasert, and Hicks (2013) simulated 
a cap on Indiana’s property tax and a corresponding revenue increase in sales taxes. In their 
study, they find long run increases in employment, income, and investment.2 
 
B. Event Literature 
  
 There is a large body of literature using CGE models to simulate the effects of 
exogenous events. For our purposes, we exclude events with a stochastic component.  In 1997, 
the News South Wales treasury partnered with the Center for Regional Economic Analysis to 
look at the state and national economies for the 6 years prior to and the 6 years after the 2000 
                                                     
2
 No additional scientific literature was found on CGE models studying state level tax reforms. However, there are 
numerous policy evaluations done by REMI, IMPLAN, TRAIN (Tax and Revenue Analysis in Nebraska), STAMP (State 
Tax Analysis Modeling Program) out of Suffolk University, and others.  With each of these organizations, the model 
description is to some degree publically available, but the applications are not peer reviewed. 
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Sydney Olympic Games (Madden and Crowe). They predicted that the significant gains would 
go, almost exclusively, to New South Wales, the Australian state where Sydney is located. 
Similar studies have been conducted for every Olympics going back Los Angeles in 1984.  
Kasimati (2003) evaluates ex-ante studies for every summer Olympics from 1984 until 2000 and 
kindly notes their predictions were ‘optimistic’. Porter and Fletcher (2008) look back and 
evaluated models simulating the 1996 summer and the 2002 winter Olympic Games in Atlanta 
and Salt Lake City.  They concluded that because the I-O models used constant factor prices and 
technical coefficients, they overstated the effects. Madden (2006), who had previously 
employed I-O models for this purpose, responded to the criticism, “I would contend, however, 
that the problems with I-O analysis are of such a fundamental nature that it should no longer be 
used for mega events of the scale of the Olympic Games… However, I-O is not the only method 
available for undertaking economic impact analysis. A more modern and much more 
sophisticated method, namely computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling, is available.” 
CGE has largely replaced I-O analysis as a result of the I-O models’ public failures.  For a recent 
meta-analysis of impact studies on a variety of major sporting events see Li and Jago (2012). 
 There are also many examples of negative events being modeled. Pambudi, McCaughey, 
and Smyth (2009) used the Indonesian version of TERM, called EMERALD, to construct a static 
model of Indonesia’s 26 provinces. In this paper, Pambudi et al. simulated the effects of the 
2002 bombing in Bali that killed 202 people. The authors exogenously “shift the export demand 
schedule for tourism commodities uniformly by 50% to the left.” This exogenous shift to the 
tourism industry, of which Bali was the largest producer, had effects throughout the provinces 
and on the country’s terms of trade and exchange rates.  
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 Looking at Australia and using a Monash University model, Horridge et al. (2005) used 
TERM to study the 44 regional effects of the 2002-03 drought, which was the worst drought in 
two decades. They find that effects on some statistical divisions are extreme, with income 
losses of up to 20%. Despite the relatively small share of agriculture in Australian GDP, the 
drought reduces GDP by 1.6%, and contributes to a decline in unemployment and to a 
worsening of the balance of trade.”  
 Kawai and Zhai (2009) built a custom model in GAMS with 17 regions focusing on the 
Asian block. Their model simulated integration and economic interactions of the export driven 
Asian economies during the “evaporation” of US consumption. They find that “a combination of 
domestic reform aimed at boosting service sector productivity and external liberalization aimed 
at fostering broader economic integration” will be critical as the Asian economies rebalance 
after an end to the export-driven growth period of the past few decades.  
 Additional topics studied using this methodology in CGE include the impact of El Niño on 
Mexican agriculture (Harris and Robinson, 2001); the effect of remittance shocks on El Salvador 
(Morley, Piñeiro, and Robinson, 2011); the effect of changes in the international prices of 
tobacco and petroleum products on Malawi (Löfgren et al., 2001); the economic impact of AIDS 
in Cameroon (Kambou, Devarajan, and Over, 1992); and the effect of coups in Fiji (Narayan and 
Prasad, 2007).  In addition to these economic impact studies of real exogenous events, 
numerous papers used this method for estimating resilience to disasters such as an earthquake, 
terrorist attack, or water disruption (Rose and Liao, 2005).  For an overview, refer to the work 
of Dwyer, Forsyth, and Spurr titled, “Assessing the Economic Impacts of Events: A Computable 
General Equilibrium Approach” (2006). 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM IN GEORGIA 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Georgia tax reform is a fresh topic. Georgia’s Special Council on Tax Reform and Fairness 
for Georgians (Special Council) issued its final report on January 7, 2011.  This final report 
outlined a revenue neutral tax reform policy with specific tax rate adjustments, exemptions, 
and inclusions.  These changes followed the basic premise that the tax structure should be 
broad based with low rates.  They recommended expanded application of the sales tax to 
personal and household services and household food consumption; a reduced personal income 
tax rate with less deductions; a lower corporate income tax rate; the elimination of sales tax 
exemptions on inputs for the education, health, and movie industries; and a new exemption on 
energy used in the agriculture, mining, and manufacturing industries. These approaches for 
reforming the tax code in Georgia were in keeping with the Special Council’s stated ‘guiding 
principles’ and represented a shift away from the income tax and towards consumption-based 
or use taxes.   
This research will simulate the Special Council’s approach using a subnational CGE 
model of Georgia. The simulations will include an expansion of sales tax to previously untaxed 
sectors, proposed tax exemptions, proposed eliminations of exclusions, and the reduction of 
the personal and corporate income taxes.  In addition to the simulation of the Special Council’s 
proposals, this paper will also simulate the elimination of the personal and corporate income 
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taxes, which are replaced with an expanded sales tax so that the tax change is revenue neutral. 
The effects of each of these tax policy changes are evaluated using total economic output of the 
state, state tax revenue, industry output, and household utility.   
 
II. GEORGIA’S TAX STRUCTURE AND REFORMS 
 
 Georgia’s tax structure, as is the case in many states, is complicated.  Georgia collects 
revenue from a combination of personal and corporate income taxes, sales tax, and taxes on 
motor fuel, tobacco, alcohol, and insurance.  Property taxes are used at the local level. While 
combining a number of taxes for revenue collection is common, the implementation of the tax 
code in Georgia is confounded by exemptions, deductions, rate schedules, and tax holidays. 
 The personal income tax (PIT) in Georgia has a top marginal rate of 6% since the 1955 
elimination of the 7% rate.  With the exception of that change, the income schedule and 
associated tax rates have remained unchanged since 1937.  Income tax is levied on incomes as 
low as $750 at a rate of 1%, and the top marginal rate of 6% is reached for a single filer at 
$7000.  Standard deductions in Georgia are significantly lower than the federal deductions, at 
$2700 for filers and $3000 for dependents.  There are also 28 additions or subtractions 
necessary to get the Georgia adjusted gross income (AGI) from the federal AGI. The PIT 
accounts for almost half of the total tax revenue for the state government. The corporate 
income tax (CIT) has changed significantly over the years. There have been numerous 
deductions and credits implemented to stimulate various sectors.  The current rate is 6%.  The  
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CIT raises less than 5% of the state’s total tax revenue. The sales and use taxes in Georgia raises 
approximately 33% of total state revenue.  The state sales tax rate is 4%, although with local 
option sales taxes used throughout the state, the rate can reach as high as 8%.  Georgia also 
offers a sales tax holiday lasting three days which applies to school items, clothing, and energy 
or water efficient products.   
 The Special Council proposed reforms to address each of the aforementioned taxes as 
well as a number of others including taxes on cigarettes, insurance premiums, E-commerce, etc.  
They did so under their own established ‘guiding principles’ that the tax structure should be 
growth enhancing, efficient, stable, clear, fair and equitable, properly developed, and have an 
avenue for resolution of disputes.  Their final report was considerably more detailed than is 
summarized here, but from a broader perspective it constituted a shift from the income tax 
toward the sales and use tax as the primary vehicle of revenue generation for the state.  They 
recommended a lowering of the PIT ultimately to 4% which would be applied as a flat rate.  The 
CIT would also fall along with the PIT to 4%.  To make up for the lost revenue, they also 
recommended an expansion of sales and use taxes on services, food, and inputs for health, 
education, and movies. 
 
III. SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX 
 
 A social accounting matrix is a framework of economic data for a geographic region in 
which each cell represents a payment from the account of its column to the account of its row 
resulting in a square matrix of data in which expenditures are in the column and incomes in the 
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row.3  Within the SAM framework, because of double entry accounting, the sum of an account 
row equals the sum of its account column.  Columns and rows are similarly labeled according to 
whatever the desired disaggregation of activities, commodities, factors, institutions, and both 
foreign and domestic trade.   
 The SAM for this paper was extracted from IMPLAN using 2010 data and aggregated in 
GAMS4.  The extracted data originally included 440 activities and 440 commodities.  These were 
aggregated to 15 of each.  The three factors include labor, capital, and indirect taxes.  There are 
16 institutions: nine households organized by income; three federal government institutions for 
non-defense, defense, and investment; three state government institutions for non-education, 
education, and investment; and one aggregation of enterprises, investment, and inventory 
deletions. The last two rows and columns include foreign trade and domestic trade.  The final 
aggregated SAM is 51 rows x 51 columns. Individuals and firms are aggregated according to 
their income group or industry, respectively, and these aggregations are modeled as if the 
entire income group was a single representative consumer or the entire industry was a single 
representative firm.  It is important to note that a commodity’s production is not limited to that 
corresponding industrial activity; for example, the mining activity can produce a manufacturing 
commodity. Aggregation is necessary so that the solution algorithm is capable of finding a 
convergent solution. 
                                                     
3
 When referencing a specific cell in the SAM, we will refer to it using matrix notation so SAM(i,j) will refer to the 
cell in the SAM in the row i and column j.    
4
 See Appendix D for information regarding the Georgia SAM. 
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  IV. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SPECIFICATION 
  
The model used here is based on the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
CGE model described in Lofgren et al. (2002).  It was later adapted for regional modeling 
purposes by Holland, Stodick, and Devadoss in their Washington-Idaho model (2004) to include 
domestic and foreign trade.  This model was developed in General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) and thus adaptable for alternative purposes.  Because the CGE model is a system of 
linear and nonlinear equations in which the number of equations is equal to the number of 
endogenous variables in the model, the PATH solver, which is a generalized variation of 
Newton’s method, is used to calculate the solution. 
When accounting for each individual commodity, activity, factor, household, 
government unit, and foreign sector, the model contains 839 individual equations and 839 
individual variables. These equations and variables are divided into four blocks: a production  
and trade block, an institution block, a price block, and a constraints block. The 
production and trade block refers to the equations that reveal the endogenous equilibrium 
quantities. The institution block governs the behavior of the institutions which include 
households, government, and enterprises and investment. The price block refers to the system 
of equations that reveals the endogenous equilibrium prices. The constraint block ensures a 
square system of equations by enforcing constraints such as the factor demand equals the 
factor supply.   
This model does not contain an objective function. Its equations define the behavior of 
factors in the economy such that their behavior is subject to first order optimality conditions. 
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The model assumes that producers and consumers will maximize profit and utility, given prices, 
endowments, and technology. The maximization is subject to constraints for the behavior of 
markets and governmental units as well as macroeconomic flows such as savings, investment, 
or foreign demand.  Households provide the factors—labor and capital—to firms that use these 
factors as well as intermediate inputs to produce the final output.  Intermediate goods are an 
Armington composite of domestic and imported goods.   
Trading partners include the RUS and foreign trade. The final output generated is 
allocated to domestic consumption and exports.  Households consume final goods and public 
services, and either save or borrow the remainder of final output. The government consumes 
intermediate goods, produces public services, and distributes money in the form of transfers to 
institutions. The government tax revenue includes all transfers from institutions and all revenue  
generated by taxes on intermediate and final goods. In any CGE model, there are more 
equations than are possible to detail in an applied paper.  However, because this paper looks at 
the effects of tax reform on households, firms, and the government, it is important to consider 
the utility-maximizing households, profit-maximizing producers, and the treatment of taxes and 
government within the model.   
 
A. Consumption 
 
Consumers are divided into nine households according to income level. Households 
receive income from factor endowments and from transfers from other households, 
government, and enterprises.  Household income is used to pay taxes, to fund transfers to 
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other households, to consume domestic market commodities and foreign goods, and to save. 
Household income available for consumption is the income received from factors and transfers 
net of taxes, transfers to other institutions, and savings.  Household consumption of market 
commodities is governed by: 
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 (1) 
where,  
QHc,h = the quantity consumed of commodity c by household h,  
ϒc,h = the subsistence level of consumption of market commodity c for household h,  
βc,h = the marginal share of consumption spent on market commodity c for household h,  
EHh = net income of taxes, savings, and transfers,  
PCc = the composite price of commodity c,  
tqc = the sales tax on commodity c.  
 
This is a linear expenditure system function and the first-order condition for a Stone-
Geary utility function, which governs the utility-maximizing consumers.  Multiplying both sides 
of the equation by the relevant prices would derive the total household spending on marketed 
commodities. Note that activities are not included in this equation as there is no home 
consumption at the cost of production in the SAM.  Also, the prices are those paid by 
consumers for the composite good of domestic and imported commodities.     
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B. Production 
 
 The SAM is aggregated to 15 industries for both activities and commodities.  There are 
two factors: labor and capital.  A producer is represented as an activity and is modeled to 
maximize the difference between revenue earned and the cost of factors of production and 
intermediate inputs. Revenue is earned by selling the commodities produced by an activity. This 
profit maximization is subject to the technology. All participants in the market are price takers. 
Table 1 lists the 15 industrial commodity and activity aggregations. 
 
TABLE 1 – Aggregated industry labeling key 
Aggregation Label Aggregation Description 
AFFH Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 
MIN Mining 
MANUF Manufacturing 
MEDIMAN Medical equipment manufacturing 
UTIL Utilities 
FOOD Groceries for home consumption 
INFOSER Information services 
HEEDSER Health and education services 
OTHSER All other services 
CONST Construction 
WHOLTRAD Wholesale trade 
RETTRAD Retail trade 
TRAN Transportation 
MOVIE Motion picture and music video production 
GOVSPC Government services 
  
 
 The technology is modeled by a nested function with constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) and Leontief functional forms contained within.  To produce output, the firms use factors 
and intermediate inputs. Using factors, we derive the value added using a CES function.  
Intermediate input of commodity c used by activity a is derived using a Leontief function. The 
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value added and intermediate inputs are then combined in the top level of the nested function 
using a CES functional form for the final activity level. Each representative firm chooses its 
optimal activity level by optimizing the combination of value added and intermediate inputs 
such that they are consumed until their marginal revenue product is equal to their price.  This 
process reveals the activity level of the firms. 
 Valued added is derived in Equation 2: 
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 (2) 
where,  
QVAa = quantity of aggregate value added by activity a, 
α = value added shift parameter, 
δ = value added share parameter,  
QFf,c = quantity demanded of factor f for activity a,  
ρ = transformation of the elasticity of factor substitution.   
 
Here we see that the value added is derived from a CES function of disaggregated factor 
quantities. 
 Intermediate inputs are derived using Equation 3: 
 
                    (3) 
where,  
QINTa,c = intermediate demand for commodity c from activity a, 
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φ = quantity of commodity c used as an intermediate good per unit of activity a, 
QINTAa = quantity of aggregate intermediate input for activity a. 
Here we see that firms’ demand for specific commodities as intermediate inputs for their 
activity is derived using a Leontief function with a fixed intermediate input coefficient. 
 Next in the production function we must combine the value added and intermediate 
inputs using a CES function:  
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     (4) 
where,  
QAa = activity level for activity a,  
α = activity shift parameter,  
δ = activity share parameter,  
QVAa = quantity of aggregate value added for activity a, 
QINTa,c = intermediate demand for commodity c from activity a, 
ρ = is a transformation of the value added and inputs elasticity of substitution for 
activity a .   
 
Equation 4 is the CES function at the ‘top’ of the nested function. Below this are the CES value 
added function and the Leontief intermediate inputs function, Equations 2 and 3, respectively.  
The optimal choices of value added and intermediate inputs, and thus factors and aggregate 
intermediate inputs, is derived by their relative prices. This is the primary mechanism by which 
industrial output is altered by policy simulations. 
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With all factors combined with all inputs to produce an activity level, we can determine 
the quantity of marketable commodities produced by the activity: 
 
                 (5) 
Where,  
QXa,c = marketed quantity of commodity c from activity a, 
Øa,c = fixed yield coefficient for the quantity of commodity output c per unit of activity a, 
QAa,c = production of commodity c from activity a. 
This configuration allows each activity to produce any commodity and each commodity to be 
produced by any activity.   
 Equation 6 is the domestic commodity output aggregation function: 
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where,  
QXc = aggregated marketed quantity of domestic output of commodity c,  
α = shift parameter,  
δ = share parameter,  
QXa,c = marketed quantity of commodity c from activity a,  
ρa,c = domestic commodity aggregation function exponent of activity a for commodity c.   
In Equation 6 we see that the aggregate marketed quantity of a commodity is a CES aggregate 
of the marketed output of the activities producing the commodity. 
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The first-order condition of the domestic commodity aggregation function is: 
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where,  
PPa,c = producer price of commodity c for activity a,  
PPc = aggregate producer price of commodity c produced from all activities,  
QXc = aggregated marketed quantity of domestic output of commodity c,  
δ = share parameter,  
QXa,c = marketed quantity of commodity c from activity a,  
ρa,c = is a transformation of the elasticity of substitution of activity a for commodity c. 
 
In Equation 7 the marginal cost of commodity c from activity a equals the marginal revenue 
product of commodity c from activity a.   
 Together Equations 6 and 7 are the first-order conditions for our profit-maximizing 
representative firms selling their optimized activity at the market price PC subject to the 
aggregation function and the disaggregated commodity producer price PP. Regarding the prices  
in the consumption and production equations, note that PCc, the composite price of commodity 
c; PPc, the aggregate producer price from all activities for commodity c; and PPa,c, the producer 
price of commodity c for activity a, can be different from one another and those differences 
may change as the model allows for trade and tariffs, as well as taxes according to activity or 
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commodity.  Demonstrated here are three of the 10 prices included in the model. Relationships 
between the 10 different modeled prices are contained in the 10 equations of the price block.  
 
C. Taxes 
 
 Government revenue in a generic SAM format and the model can be derived from 
numerous sources: direct taxes on institutions (households and enterprises), direct taxes on 
factors, value added taxes, activity taxes, import tariffs, export taxes, sales taxes, factor income, 
and transfers from other governmental units and the ROW5. This shows the versatility of the 
format and the Lofgren model. However, when looking at Georgia, not all of these apply.  
Georgia’s revenue is derived using direct taxes on individuals and enterprises, taxes on factors, 
indirect taxes, and transfers from the federal government.  For our purposes, federal 
government transfers are left unchanged and we focus on the taxes altered by the proposed 
reform: income tax, sales tax, and taxes on intermediate inputs.  
 In the model we simulate a change in the income tax by adjusting the ratio of transfers 
to the state as a proportion of total expenditure.  However, total expenditure equals total 
income, and household income is derived from the labor endowment as well as the capital 
endowment, transfer payments, and dividends. An additional complication arises because the 
                                                     
5
 For brevity we omit the equation for total government revenue, but for each source of tax revenue the tax rate is 
either applied to the stock, as in the case of factors, or applied to the product of the price and the total for that 
source, as in the case of a value added tax (Revenue = Tax * (Price of Value Added * Total Value Added).  These 
taxes can be institution, factor, activity, commodity, or trading partner specific. 
  32  
 
direct transfers from households to the state include not only income tax, but also property tax, 
estate tax, and some minor fees such as hunting licenses.  These calculations are explained in 
the simulations section.  Regarding the model, the simulation is done by declaring a variable: 
 
 
    
   (    ))
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 (8) 
where,  
tyh = direct tax rate given by the SAM for a household h,  
SAM (SG, H) = transfers from households H to the state government SG,  
SAM (Total, H) = total expenditure for a household H.  
 
The value of this parameter is then controlled in the counterfactual simulation. We cannot 
simply declare a variable for the ratio of transfers from households as a proportion of labor 
income (though we tried) because the direct tax rate on households is used repeatedly 
elsewhere in the model. How this is used to adjust the tax on the factor labor is explained in the 
simulations section. 
 The corporate income tax (CIT) is similarly problematic as it encompasses transfers from 
the capital factor to the state and transfers from enterprises to the state.  Compounding the 
problem is the aggregation of enterprises and investment.  A calculation similar to the case of 
the income tax is possible, but a look at the original unaggregated IMPLAN data reveals that the 
enterprise portion of the CIT captures 0.6% of the total CIT paid to the state and represents 
0.0026% of the aggregated column total.  Furthermore, all portions of this aggregation are 
estimated by IMPLAN rather than retrieved from primary data sources.  Finally, this portion of  
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the SAM plays a small role in the variables we are using to evaluate the policy simulations and 
serves primarily to facilitate the investment and savings closure conditions. The enterprise 
portion of the CIT is being ignored because:  it is effectively inconsequential to the CIT; it is 
almost lost in the column aggregation; it is based on an estimated IMPLAN SAM; and it would 
require modification of numerous closure rules. Thus, we may declare a variable:  
 
 
    
   (    ))
   (       )
 (9) 
where,  
tyk = tax rate on capital factor k,  
SAM (SG, K) = transfer from capital K to the state government SG,  
SAM (Total, K) = total expenditure of capital K.  
 
The value of this parameter is controlled in the counterfactual simulation.   
 The sales tax is found in two places: as a portion of the transfers from activities to 
indirect taxes and in transfers from commodities to the state.  Transfers to the state from 
commodities are pure sales taxes. Transfers from activities to indirect taxes include state and 
local sales taxes, property taxes, motor vehicle taxes, payments for licenses and fees, and 
others. In this case we are not concerned primarily with the exact amount of revenue raised by 
the sales taxes separate from the other indirect taxes. Rather, we are interested in the amount 
of additional tax revenue raised by an increase in the sales tax rates in certain industries, as well 
as the effects of these tax increases along with other tax changes on the general equilibrium 
itself.  Because our focus is broad enough, we can use the variable tq found in the equation for  
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household consumption of market commodities as seen in Equation 1:  
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 (10) 
where,  
QHc,h = the quantity consumed of commodity c by household h,  
ϒc,h = the subsistence level of consumption of market commodity c for household h,  
β c,h = the marginal share of consumption spent on market commodity c for household h,  
EHh = net income of taxes, savings, and transfers,  
PC = the composite price of commodity c,  
tqc = the sales tax on commodity c.  
 
This approach will allow us to determine in the model the change in revenue from the 
imposition of an additional tax on commodities by industry. 6  The use of this variable is simple, 
but the calculation of this variable is not. Because we wish to expand the tax to previously 
untaxed sectors, while in the aggregation we have some untaxed industries combined with 
taxed industries, the estimation of this tax change must include sales taxes already paid.  This 
can only be roughly approximated to give us an average sales tax rate on final goods. The 
calculation is detailed in the simulations section.  
                                                     
6
 Georgia also has local sales taxes that often equal the state’s rate.  In the model, these would be included in the 
transfers from activities to indirect taxes, allocated to the state, and then distributed to the local governments for 
education and investment. The amount transferred to the local governments, those that don’t collect direct taxes, 
for education and investment is approximately equal to the total transfers from activities to indirect taxes.    
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 The final tax is the tax on intermediate inputs.  There is not enough information in the 
SAM to isolate this tax, declare a parameter, and control it in the counterfactual.  However, 
again we can ignore our inability to isolate the tax, its revenue, and its rate because we are 
primarily concerned with the effects of its change. In this instance, we allow the price of 
intermediate goods to be tax inclusive in the baseline.  We assume the tax on inputs is zero in 
the baseline and alter it in the counterfactual to simulate the reforms. Here, we include a tax on 
intermediate inputs, tqinp, when calculating the quantity of intermediate use of commodity c 
by activity a: 
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     (          )
 
(11) 
 where,  
QINTc,a = intermediate use of commodity c by activity a,  
SAM (C, A) = marketed outputs of commodity c produced by activity a,  
PQOc = composite commodity price of commodity c,  
tqinpa,c = tax on activity a used to produce commodity c.   
 
This variable, tqinp, also appears in the calculation of government revenue and value added 
price. The Leontief coefficients in the production function are unaffected by the tax on inputs.   
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D Trade 
 
 Trade is modeled between Georgia, the RUS, and the ROW. Each region is a monopoly 
provider of their differentiated exports. Trade plays a minor role in this model as the aggregate 
effects of Georgia’s policy change has little effect on the value of the dollar and Georgia uses 
the same currency as its domestic trading partners. For this reason, the exchange rate is held 
constant while the ROW and the RUS savings are allowed to adjust.  Equation 12 gives the trade 
calculation for the current account balance: 
 
 ∑        
  
 ∑    
 
 ∑        
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(12) 
where,  
PWMc = import price of commodity c, 
QMc = quantity of imported commodity c,  
TFAf = total factor transfers to ROW and RUS, 
PWEc = export price of commodity c,  
QEc = quantity of exported commodity c,  
TIAi = transfers from ROW and RUS to institution i,  
FSAV = foreign savings. 
 
In our closure rules, with foreign savings endogenous, the exchange rate is normalized and held 
constant while foreign savings adjusts. The result is that the sum of non-government savings, 
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government savings, and foreign savings is equal to the sum of fixed investment and the stock 
change. 
 
V. CALIBRATION 
 
A. Tax Revenue 
 
 From the SAM we derive the total amount of revenue collected by the state through 
taxes on commodities, activities, households, and capital.  In the table below, we show the 
allocation we take from IMPLAN compared to the FY 2010 Governor’s Budget Report (in 
millions of dollars).  Note that we divide taxes within our SAM into the personal income tax 
(PIT), the corporate income tax (CIT), and the sales tax.  The category ‘other’ refers to the taxes 
on motor fuels, insurance premiums, vehicle licenses, alcohol, tobacco, and property.  Within 
IMPLAN, we cannot identify exactly where each of these is allocated and in what proportion.  
Furthermore, we are only concerned with revenue that corresponds to the state’s taxes rather 
than federal and local taxes, so those tax revenues have been excluded from Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 – Data extract and budget comparison (in millions of $) 
  IMPLAN FY 2010 
PIT $9,886 $7,016 
Sales and Use $4,083 $4,864 
CIT $   740 $   684 
Other na  $1,894 
Total $14,709 $14,460 
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Because IMPLAN aggregates taxes together while our SAM contains divisions of taxes 
collected by the state for both the state and localities and from numerous taxes, our numbers 
do not exactly match the FY 2010 numbers from the Georgia budget.  However, the totals are 
very close, with our IMPLAN data giving us a total revenue number 1.7% higher than the FY2010 
budget numbers. 
 
B. Parameters 
 
TABLE 3 – Parameter values  
Parameter Value 
Elasticity of substitution for production between labor and capital .9 
Elasticity of substitution (Armington) between Georgia output and imports 2 
Elasticity of substitution (transformation) between Georgia and foreign demand 2 
Elasticity of substitution (transformation) between ROW and RUS for exports 1.35 
Elasticity of substitution (Armington) between ROW imports and RUS  imports 1.35 
Income elasticity 1 
Investment on commodities elasticity 1 
Consumption flexibility -1 
Investment demand flexibility -1 
Supply elasticity for labor 2 
Supply elasticity for capital .5 
   
 Note that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the production 
function is set to near unity so the CES functional form closely resembles Cobb-Douglas. The 
elasticities of substitution between Georgia and its trading partners—the ROW and RUS—are 
set higher than those between the ROW and RUS. This decision was made to simulate the 
greater degree of openness found in regional economies than found in national or international 
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economies.7  The income elasticity and investment on commodities elasticity parameters were 
taken from the recommended values of Holland, Stodick, and Davadoss (2004).  The flexibility 
parameters are used to set the subsistence level of consumption of investment.  Having these 
set equal to -1 allows for no minimum level. The supply elasticities of labor and capital reflect 
that labor is more easily substituted than capital. Sensitivity analysis was conducted by altering 
functional forms and parameter values with no substantive change in results.  
 
VI. SPECIAL COUNCIL SIMULATIONS 
 
 We simulate the general tax reforms recommended by the Special Council, which 
include a reduced and flat PIT of 4%, a reduced CIT of 4%, and an expansion of the 4% state 
sales tax to previously untaxed food and services. In addition to these three changes, the 
Special Council called for an expansion of the sales tax on inputs for the movie industry, health 
services, and education services. In the case of the movie industry, this was originally done to 
attract the industry to Georgia.  For health and education, these were not taxed for political 
reasons: when consumed as final goods, they enjoy exemptions from sales taxes on inputs. 
Because the sales tax on these as final goods does not apply, tax cascading cannot occur, so it 
was recommended that the exemption be eliminated.  Finally, the Special Council 
recommended new tax exemptions on energy inputs for agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.   
                                                     
7
 See the average US Armington elasticities in Galloway, McDaniel, and Rivera (2003) as well as Thaiprasert, Faulk, 
and Hicks (2011) for these figures use in an IMPLAN data based CGE model.  
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 The PIT in the model is given by the ratio of direct taxes to total expenditures: 
 
 
    
   (    ))
   (       )
 (13) 
We are interested in the ratio of direct taxes to labor income, which cannot be directly 
controlled in the model. To determine the change here, we first look at the original statutory 
tax code and the proposed tax code, and calculate the average tax rate for each household 
under the original tax code and the proposed new code. This calculation was done for both the 
original tax code and the proposed reform for single filers and filers who are married with two 
children (M2K). These were then averaged to determine the ratio of the average tax rate under 
the reform to the original tax code. This gives us the ratio that we can apply to ratio of the 
direct tax as a proportion of labor income.  We applied this ratio to our variable ty and checked 
that the desired effect was achieved.  The difference between the ratio of income tax rate in 
the simulation to the income tax rate in the baseline, and the ratio of the income tax rate in the 
reform to the income tax rate under the previous statutes is nearly identical8. This reveals that 
the change in income tax we are simulating is very similar in size and scope to the proposed 
reform.  
 Also of note regarding the direct tax rates by income group are some discrepancies in 
the SAM regarding the average tax rates and the income groups. Note in Table 4 that the 
calculated income per capita does not fall in the income range as aggregated in the extraction 
for household groups 2, 6, 7 and 8. The disparity is largest for household 2.  
                                                     
8
 Refer to Table A1 in the appendix for calculations of the differences between the alternative tax treatments. 
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 Regarding the tax rates, they are unusually high for household group 1 and unusually 
low for household group 2. This could be because the poorest group is primarily single filers 
with few deductions, while household group 2 has a higher proportion of married households 
with children and thus more deductions. Regardless, we apply the tax reform as calculated to 
the tax rates as extracted. These unusual IMPLAN tax rates for low income groups could cause 
problems if adjustments are not made relative to the baseline. 
 
TABLE 4 – Household tax rates and income per capita (in dollars) 
  HHD1 HHD2 HHD3 HHD4 HHD5 HHD6 HHD7 HHD8 HHD9 
Income range 0-10k 10-15k 15-25k 25-35k 35-50k 50-75k 75-100k 100-150k 150k+ 
Baseline tax rate 5.20% 1.35% 3.40% 4.03% 3.96% 4.26% 4.78% 4.96% 7.24% 
Simulated tax rate 3.27% 1.00% 3.29% 3.96% 3.32% 3.28% 3.54% 3.54% 4.95% 
Income per capita $3,458 $6,335 $16,010 $28,547 $44,748 $76,525 $103,929 $156,262 $376,941 
 
 For the expansion of the sales tax to food and services, we look at three industries: food, 
other services, and information services. To simulate this tax reform we must increase the sales 
tax rate from its current rate to 4%. In each of these industries, some amount of indirect taxes 
is paid, so we must account for this as we calculate the additional tax. To do this, we first 
calculate the amount of revenue to be raised by a 4% tax on final consumption. We then 
subtract out the indirect taxes already paid. This is an approximation because we only have the 
breakdown of indirect taxes as an aggregation of all industries. However, from the IMPLAN 
breakdown we know that the proportion of sales taxes paid to the state as a proportion of total 
indirect taxes is 21%. Using this percentage, we can estimate the amount of sales taxes already 
paid as a proportion of sales taxes that would be raised by a 4% sales tax, and then calculate 
  42  
 
the additional tax needed to raise that revenue. This simulates an expansion of the sales tax so 
that the average sales tax rate is 4%.   
 We alter the tax rate on intermediate inputs to simulate the elimination or expansion of 
taxes on inputs used by specific industries.  For the elimination of the tax exemption for movies, 
health services, and education services, we increase the taxes paid on activities used to produce 
the industry’s commodities. For movies, the Special Council recommends the sales tax be 
applied to purchases of “production equipment by film producers and film production 
companies used to produce films for nationwide distribution.” To simulate this, we introduce a 
4% intermediate input tax to movie industry activities used in the production of movie 
commodities. For health and education services, this tax applies to all activities that produce 
health and education services. To introduce new sales tax exemptions for energy used by the 
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing industries, we introduce a negative intermediate input 
tax on the use of utilities by these industries. This last change to the intermediate input price of 
utilities for agriculture, mining, and manufacturing is an approximation of the actual change, as 
the utilities industry is not exclusively energy.  
  Three simulations are done relative to the calibrated baseline. The three simulations 
differ according to their treatment of labor and capital mobility and the endowments. In the 
long run, both capital and labor are mobile and the endowments are variable.  There are two 
short run simulations. In the shortest run, labor is mobile between industries, but the total 
endowment is fixed. Capital, in the shortest run, is industry specific and fixed by activity. 
Relaxing the capital restrictions from the shortest run, we get a short run simulation, with labor 
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again mobile between industries with a fixed total endowment, but capital is mobile with a 
fixed total state endowment.   
VII. SPECIAL COUNCIL SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
 We compare the simulations to the baseline scenario and one another by looking at the 
effects on the state’s economy and budget, households, and industries. 
 
A. State Results 
 
 There are four ways we can look at the effects of tax reform on the state. These are 
labeled in Table 4 as GDP-1, GDP-2, GDP-3, and GDP-4.  GDP-1 is the wage and capital bill at 
factor cost.  GDP-2 is the traditional consumption, investment, government, and net exports 
calculated at market prices. GDP-3 is the value added given by the wage and capital bill plus 
indirect taxes.  GDP-4 is given by the total activity minus intermediate costs.  Note that in the 
baseline, GDP-1 and GDP-4 are equal, and GDP-2 and GDP-3 are equal.  In the counterfactual 
simulations, we see that they differ as the numeraire prices set to unity in the baseline change 
in the simulations. 
 In Table 5, we see the results given in millions of dollars.  The GDP changes are all 
positive for short run and long run simulations.  The increase is more than twice as large in the 
long run as in either of the short run simulations. We see the GDP increases slightly in the 
shortest run than in the short run, likely due to the slightly higher prices that result in this 
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simulation.  We can interpret this result by saying that, within the model, GDP for the state will 
increase by a bit less than one tenth of one percent in the long run, given this tax reform.  
However, results of a magnitude this small should be interpreted with restraint. Because the 
changes are so small, a more precise interpretation may be that this revenue neutral tax reform 
will have a negligible impact on the state’s GDP. 
 
TABLE 5 – Baseline and simulated state GDP (in millions of dollars) 
 
Base Calculated Difference Percent Change 
Long Run 
    
GDP-1 393,829 394,117 287 0.07% 
GDP-2 423,435 423,775 339 0.08% 
GDP-3 423,435 423,785 350 0.08% 
GDP-4 393,829 394,107 277 0.07% 
     
Short Run 
    
GDP-1 393,829 393,941 112 0.03% 
GDP-2 423,435 423,583 147 0.04% 
GDP-3 423,435 423,593 157 0.04% 
GDP-4 393,829 393,931 102 0.03% 
     
Shortest Run 
    
GDP-1 393,829 393,954 125 0.03% 
GDP-2 423,435 423,589 154 0.04% 
GDP-3 423,435 423,598 163 0.04% 
GDP-4 393,829 393,944 115 0.03% 
 
 Regarding the state government’s budget, Table 6 breaks out the changes to revenue 
from various sources of tax revenue.  Note that the revenue from intermediate taxes is set to 
zero in the baseline, although the state does collect this tax. The currently collected 
intermediate tax is found within indirect business taxes, which are not included here as they are 
transferred to the localities. Also not included here are transfers to the state from the federal 
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government which remain constant. The intermediate row and the sales tax row are separated 
in the simulation SAM, so that their sums give us the changes caused by our tax adjustments.  
 
TABLE 6 – Baseline and simulation tax revenue by source (in millions of dollars) 
 
Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated Difference Calculated Difference Calculated Difference 
PIT 9,886 7,435 -2,451 7,429 -2,457 7,430 -2,457 
CIT 816 564 -252 564 -252 564 -252 
Sales 4,083 6,727 2,644 6,724 2,641 6,727 2,644 
Intermediate 0 -10 -10 -10 -10 -9 -9 
Total 14,785 14,716 -70 14,707 -78 14,712 -74 
 
 Here we see that the state collects less total taxes, but the reform is almost budget 
neutral, as the largest change in any of the simulations is $78 million dollars less than the 
original tax revenue of $14.79 billion.  We also see that the change adds slightly more revenue 
in the long run model than in either of the short run models. 
 
B. Household Results 
 
 We calculate utilities and equivalent variations for each household group under each of 
the three simulations. We see in Tables 7 and 8 that the effect of the tax reform is minimal. This 
is expected, as the state tax burden represents a fraction of the total tax burden. With the 
exception of household 1 in the long run, we see that the effects on utilities are negative for 
households 1 through 5, those making less than $50,000, and positive for households 6 through 
9, those making more than $50,000.  
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TABLE 7 – Baseline and simulation utility by household 
 
Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference 
HHD1 7.359 7.361 0.021 7.358 (0.012) 7.359 (0.010) 
HHD2 6.912 6.912 (0.006) 6.910 (0.038) 6.910 (0.037) 
HHD3 7.798 7.796 (0.025) 7.794 (0.047) 7.794 (0.046) 
HHD4 8.032 8.028 (0.048) 8.027 (0.064) 8.027 (0.063) 
HHD5 8.523 8.522 (0.012) 8.521 (0.025) 8.521 (0.024) 
HHD6 9.043 9.045 0.016 9.044 0.008 9.044 0.009 
HHD7 8.653 8.656 0.038 8.656 0.030 8.656 0.032 
HHD8 8.657 8.662 0.056 8.662 0.050 8.662 0.051 
HHD9 9.034 9.040 0.070 9.039 0.063 9.039 0.064 
 
 
 We can look at Table 8 for the equivalent variations, which show us the amount of 
money represented by the change in utility. Again, we see the total change for households is 
small and the net effect of the tax change is regressive in nature. This is a result of the relatively 
smaller decrease in PIT for middle-income people and the relatively larger proportion of their 
expenditure that is used to consume goods, like food, which are now taxed.   
 
TABLE 8 – Equivalent variation by household source (in dollars) 
  Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
HHD1         16.55  (9.31) (7.91) 
HHD2         (2.87) (18.48) (17.94) 
HHD3         (33.50) (63.33) (62.70) 
HHD4         (83.38) (112.56) (110.99) 
HHD5         (38.62) (78.75) (76.56) 
HHD6         85.04  40.47  45.90  
HHD7         134.06  105.20  109.48  
HHD8         193.05  171.17  174.62  
HHD9         341.28  304.30  310.98  
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C. Industry Results 
 
 Industries are aggregated into 15 categories, as labeled in Table 89. The industries give 
us labels for both activities and commodities.  Activities and commodities are differentiated 
using by an ‘A’ or ‘C’, respectively, as seen in Tables 10 and 11.   
 
TABLE 9 – Aggregated industry labeling key 
Aggregation Label Aggregation Description 
AFFH Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 
MIN Mining 
MANUF Manufacturing 
MEDIMAN Medical equipment manufacturing 
UTIL Utilities 
FOOD Groceries for home consumption 
INFOSER Information services 
HEEDSER Health and education services 
OTHSER All other services 
CONST Construction 
WHOLTRAD Wholesale trade 
RETTRAD Retail trade 
TRAN Transportation 
MOVIE Motion picture and music video production 
GOVSPC Government services 
  
 
 In Tables 10 and 11 we have industrial output by commodity and by activity. In analyzing 
these results, we see the importance of the commodity and activity structure where a 
commodity can be produced by any activity and any activity can produce any commodity. For 
                                                     
9
 Table 8, identical to Table 1, is placed here for the reader’s convenience 
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example, a farm can produce both agriculture and wholesale trade commodities if that firm is 
vertically integrated.  
Table 10 shows the value of the total amount of a commodity that is produced 
regardless of which activity produced it.  Table 11 shows the value of all of an activity’s output 
regardless of which commodities it is producing. Here we can see that total industrial activity 
and commodity production are increased by between a fifth and a quarter of one percent in the 
long run.  The biggest growth sectors are utilities, retail trade, and health and education 
services.  Note that health and education services had increased taxes on inputs; taxes on 
utilities decreased when used as an input across agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; and 
retail trade was unaffected.  The hardest hit industries by the reform are food, other services, 
and movies, which all had tax increases imposed upon them.  Total output increases as we 
progress from the shortest run to the long run, and as capital and labor adjust.   
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TABLE 10 – Output by commodity  (in millions of dollars) 
  Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference 
AFFH-C 10,038 10,033 (0.05) 10,036 (0.02) 10,037 (0.01) 
MIN-C 1,781 1,786 0.29 1,787 0.32 1,781 (0.01) 
MANUF-C 103,260 103,371 0.11 103,361 0.10 103,233 (0.03) 
MEDIMAN-C 5,583 5,594 0.20 5,595 0.22 5,584 0.03 
UTIL-C 14,450 14,514 0.45 14,505 0.38 14,516 0.46 
FOOD-C 45,166 44,948 (0.48) 44,959 (0.46) 45,049 (0.26) 
INFOSER-C 38,675 38,776 0.26 38,765 0.23 38,730 0.14 
HEEDSER-C 53,522 54,095 1.07 54,040 0.97 54,035 0.96 
OTHSER-C 245,030 244,113 (0.37) 243,963 (0.44) 243,969 (0.43) 
CONST-C 33,797 33,795 (0.01) 33,790 (0.02) 33,795 (0.01) 
WHOLTRAD-C 38,985 39,152 0.43 39,136 0.39 39,121 0.35 
RETTRAD-C 32,450 32,790 1.05 32,763 0.96 32,762 0.96 
TRAN-C 26,788 26,867 0.29 26,855 0.25 26,834 0.17 
MOVIE-C 1,227 1,225 (0.16) 1,225 (0.19) 1,226 (0.05) 
GOVSPC-C 79,687 79,820 0.17 79,800 0.14 79,803 0.15 
Average 
  
0.22 
 
0.19 
 
0.16 
 
 
TABLE 11 – Output by activity (in millions of dollars) 
  Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference 
AFFH-A 9,622 9,618 (0.04) 9,622  0.01  9,619  (0.04) 
MIN-A 1,734 1,739 0.33  1,740  0.38  1,733  (0.03) 
MANUF-A 102,187 102,304 0.11  102,294  0.10  102,127  (0.06) 
MEDIMAN-A 5,475 5,486 0.21  5,488  0.24  5,474  (0.01) 
UTIL-A 11,745 11,900 1.32  11,896  1.29  11,785  0.34  
FOOD-A 45,098 44,900 (0.44) 44,919  (0.40) 45,039  (0.13) 
INFOSER-A 44,652 44,764 0.25  44,760  0.24  44,659  0.02  
HEEDSER-A 49,882 50,415 1.07  50,349  0.94  50,297  0.83  
OTHSER-A 236,884 235,975 (0.38) 235,859  (0.43) 236,267  (0.26) 
CONST-A 33,797 33,794 (0.01) 33,788  (0.03) 33,784  (0.04) 
WHOLTRAD-A 38,985 39,147 0.42  39,128  0.37  39,061  0.19  
RETTRAD-A 32,246 32,577 1.03  32,544  0.92  32,509  0.82  
TRAN-A 26,197 26,270 0.28  26,257  0.23  26,219  0.08  
MOVIE-A 1,214 1,203 (0.93) 1,202  (0.95) 1,208  (0.51) 
GOVSPC-A 77,069 77,162 0.12  77,112  0.06  77,097  0.04  
Average     0.22    0.20    0.08  
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VIII. INCOME TAX ELIMINATION SIMULATIONS 
  
 An interesting extension is available with our current model. One feasible alternative to 
the Special Council’s proposed tax reform is a complete elimination of personal and corporate 
income taxes, coupled with the replacement of this lost revenue with an expanded uniform 
sales tax. With the previous simulation, we instituted the recommendations as closely as 
possible to the Special Council’s proposal.  In this simulation, we eliminate the state income tax 
on individuals and corporations, and then increase a uniform sales tax rate on all final goods 
until we achieve approximate revenue neutrality. This simulation is hypothetical and done 
purely for comparison purposes. However, Georgia’s two neighboring states, Florida and 
Tennessee, have tax codes with no income taxes, and as that is the general direction of the 
Special Council’s reform proposal, it can provide guidance as we think about tax changes.  
 The specifications of this tax change include a state tax rate of zero on personal and 
corporate income. We also expand the sales tax to groceries for home consumption and 
previously untaxed services, so that the state sales tax rate is uniform across goods. We also, 
rather arbitrarily, included the Special Council’s recommendations regarding tax deductions. 
Thus, we remove the favored tax treatment of the movie industry, and include deductions on 
intermediate utilities used in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. While the inclusion of 
these structural changes could have been left out of this application, they were justified to 
maintain fairness, and for tax cascading reasons in the previous simulation. We also wanted to 
focus this comparison on the drastic changes in sales and income taxes, without clouding the 
analysis by their removal in this iteration. With this new simulation of a total replacement of 
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the personal and corporate income taxes with an increased and expanded sales tax, we again 
look at the effects on the state, households, and industries.  
 In these simulations, the baseline of the state remains unchanged from what it was in 
the Special Council simulations. The methodology for imposing constraints on the model in this 
application has not changed from what was described above.  The change to the treatment of 
intermediate goods in the movie, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing industries is 
unchanged. For both the corporate and personal income tax changes, we imposed a rate of 
zero.  
 For the sales tax rate, we used our previous work in the expansion of the sales tax to 
groceries and services. We then incrementally increased the now uniform tax rate until we 
achieved approximate revenue neutrality. This process revealed that revenue neutrality was 
reached with a sales tax rate of 9.2%.  As this would be an unlikely tax rate for a state, we set 
this at 9% and allowed for an approximately revenue neutral tax change with a net decrease in 
revenue of 4%.   
 
TABLE 12 – Sales tax revenue by treatment (in millions of dollars) 
Treatment Sales Tax Rate Exclusions Revenue Revenue ÷ sales tax rate 
Baseline 4% Food and services $4,083 $1,021 
Special Council 4% None $6,726 $1,682 
Income Tax Elimination 9% None $14,300 $1,589 
 
 Table 12 shows the average revenue collected by the sales tax across labor and capital 
closure rules by treatment. Here we see the magnitude of the tax expansion to food and 
services relative to the baseline, and to the expansion coupled with an increase in tax rate from 
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4% to 9%. Also note that the amount of revenue per percentage point of sales tax decreases 
from $1,682 to $1,589 as we increase the rate from 4% to 9%.  This result is what we would 
expect, given consumers’ ability to substitute for imports as a result of our Armington 
elasticities. The increase from the baseline to the treatments is a result of the expanded base. 
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IX. INCOME TAX ELIMINATION RESULTS 
 
A. State Results 
 
 In Table 13 we have the same four GDP measures introduced in the previous simulation.  
 
TABLE 13 – Baseline and simulated state GDP (in millions of dollars) 
 
Base Calculated Difference Percent Change 
Long Run 
    
GDP-1 393,829 393,414 -416 -0.11 
GDP-2 423,435 423,288 -147 -0.03 
GDP-3 423,435 423,233 -202 -0.05 
GDP-4 393,829 393,468 -361 -0.09 
     
Short Run 
    
GDP-1 393,829 393,446 -383 -0.10 
GDP-2 423,435 423,323 -113 -0.03 
GDP-3 423,435 423,268 -168 -0.04 
GDP-4 393,829 393,501 -328 -0.08 
     
Shortest Run  
   
GDP-1 393,829 393,075 -754 -0.19 
GDP-2 423,435 422,919 -517 -0.12 
GDP-3 423,435 422,862 -573 -0.14 
GDP-4 393,829 393,132 -698 -0.18 
 
 
In this case, we get results of similar magnitude, but of an opposite sign. Note that in all 
three closure options simulating long run, short run, and shortest run, the impact on the GDP is 
negative and ranges from -0.19 in the shortest run, to -0.03 in the short and long run 
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treatments.  The average impact in the shortest run is -0.1575.  The average impacts in the two 
treatments where labor and capital have greater mobility are -0.0625 in the short run and -0.07 
in the long run.  As with the interpretation of the changes that took place in the previous 
simulation, the most important finding here is that the magnitude is in a range between -15 and 
-7 basis points. The proper interpretation may not be one that emphasizes the negative values, 
but rather the negligible magnitude.   
 Table 14 shows revenue collected, by source, by the state government. Here we see the 
absence of personal and corporate income taxes, and the considerably larger amount of 
revenue generated by the sales tax to compensate.  The intermediate tax revenue is essentially 
unchanged from the previous treatment, as those policies are again imposed here. Also, the 
figures below show approximately 90% of the net decrease in revenue. The remainder of the 4% 
decrease in revenue is found in a lower factor income as a result of the now lower market 
clearing rental rate of capital. 
 
TABLE 14 – Baseline and simulation tax revenue by source (in millions of dollars) 
  Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated Difference Calculated Difference Calculated Difference 
PIT 9,886 0 -9,886 0 -9,886 0 -9,886 
CIT 740 0 -816 0 -816 0 -816 
Sales 4,083 14,308 10,225 14,310 10,227 14,283 10,200 
Intermediate 0 -11 -11 -11 -11 -9 -9 
Total 14,785 14,297 -488 14,299 -486 14,274 -511 
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B. Household Results 
 
 In our household results, we see the model confirm economic intuition. We expect an 
elimination of the income tax to mostly benefit those with the highest prior tax rate. We would 
further expect the expansion and increase of the sales tax to harm those for whom taxable 
consumption is the largest proportion of their income. These results are found in results for 
both utilities and equivalent variation. 
 In our utilities measures, found in Table 15, we see that the poorest households are hit 
hardest by the reform, with a decreased utility between -1.6% in the short run, and -1.5% in the 
long run. We see that utility changes are negative for all groups with annual incomes below the 
$50,000 cutoff.  For groups of annual incomes of $50,000 or more, we see utility changes near 
zero or positive reaching a high for the richest household group with an increase in utility of 
approximately .3% in the long run.10   
                                                     
10
 Households 1-5 have incomes less than $50,000.  For more details, refer to Table 4, 
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TABLE 15 – Baseline and simulation utility by household 
  Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference 
HHD1         7.359  7.246  (1.531) 7.246  (1.532) 7.240  (1.617) 
HHD2         6.912  6.816  (1.384) 6.816  (1.385) 6.809  (1.490) 
HHD3         7.798  7.734  (0.825) 7.734  (0.826) 7.727  (0.910) 
HHD4         8.032  7.993  (0.487) 7.993  (0.488) 7.990  (0.523) 
HHD5         8.523  8.503  (0.240) 8.502  (0.241) 8.490  (0.385) 
HHD6         9.043  9.044  0.015  9.044  0.014  9.043  0.002  
HHD7         8.653  8.654  0.008  8.654  0.007  8.653  (0.002) 
HHD8         8.657  8.670  0.147  8.670  0.146  8.668  0.130  
HHD9         9.034  9.061  0.298  9.061  0.297  9.060  0.288  
 
 In Table 16, we see that the equivalent variation for the average household in each 
income group agrees with our utility findings. The equivalent variations for the poorest five 
income groups with incomes below $50,000 per year all show negative equivalent variations, 
with the lowest being $543 for the poorest household group. Equivalent variations for the 
richest four households are noticeably higher, with a low of -$7 and a high of $1,377.  As with 
utilities and in our other findings, we see very little difference between our short run and long 
run closures, but both are uniformly higher than the shortest run treatment.  
 The magnitude of the equivalent variation gives an approximate scale to the utility 
findings. It is true that, in the simulation, household income net of taxes increases for each 
household, but in the after tax price of final goods, the increase ranges between 5% for 
previously taxed goods, and approximately 9% for previously untaxed goods. These increases 
hit the poorest households hardest, as they consume a much higher proportion of income. The 
-$514 value for the poorest group in the long run represents approximately 15% of their taxable  
income. This is even higher than the new increased tax rate.  Obviously, if 100% of their income 
were now spent on the goods with the highest tax increase, we should not expect an equivalent 
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variation proportionally above the tax rate. This proportion is high because transfers from 
government, other households, and a small amount of capital income increases the total 
resources available for expenditure above the calculations used for income, subject to the 
personal income tax.  It is also notable that the magnitude for the richest household group is 
less than their savings from the income tax elimination.  Their proportion is less than a single 
percent of their total taxable income.  This may be a result of the relatively lower return to 
capital, which represents approximately 40% of their income.   
 
TABLE 16 – Equivalent variation by household (in dollars) 
  Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
HHD1 (514) (515) (543) 
HHD2 (283) (283) (304) 
HHD3 (460) (461) (507) 
HHD4 (348) (348) (373) 
HHD5 (304) (306) (488) 
HHD6 82  77  11  
HHD7 27  23  (7) 
HHD8 499  496  442  
HHD9 1,377  1,366  1,339  
  
These household findings could be an understatement of the regressivity in other ways 
as well. We might expect richer households to have a greater ability to avoid taxes by importing 
goods from other regions. This would require justification, but variation in the Armington  
elasticities between income groups could exacerbate the regressivity. Higher sales tax might 
harder hit industries such as tourism, which hire many lower-wage workers. Also, the 
equivalent variation for household 1 (HHD1) may be understated because that household had a 
high initial income tax rate (shown in Table 4) and thus received unusually high income tax 
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relief with its elimination.  Also not included in this model are any feedback effects on federal 
income taxes or transfers.  For example, high earners would now be transferring more to the 
federal government because they are deducting less for state income taxes paid; for the same 
reason, low earners might receive less in transfers as a result of higher federal income tax 
liability.  
 We are reluctant to draw more refined conclusions from the magnitude of the 
household effects for low income groups due to peculiarities in the IMPLAN extract for these 
households, especially groups 1 and 2.  Also, the magnitudes for low earners are particularly 
acute, while those for the high income earners are particularly weak. Finally, corner solution 
models with tax rates of zero can present problems that are unresolvable with a model 
designed for general rather than specific purposes.  Regardless of our trepidation regarding 
magnitudes, the regressivity of the reform is clear. 
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C. Industry Results 
 
 In our industry results for this treatment we use the labels found in Table 17, which are 
the same as those listed in Tables 1 and 9. 
 
TABLE 17 – Aggregated industry labeling key 
Aggregation Label Aggregation Description 
AFFH Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 
MIN Mining 
MANUF Manufacturing 
MEDIMAN Medical equipment manufacturing 
UTIL Utilities 
FOOD Groceries for home consumption 
INFOSER Information services 
HEEDSER Health and education services 
OTHSER All other services 
CONST Construction 
WHOLTRAD Wholesale trade 
RETTRAD Retail trade 
TRAN Transportation 
MOVIE Motion picture and music video production 
GOVSPC Government services 
  
 
 There is an important caveat to address in our industry results: our decision to impose a 
9% rather than a 9.2% sales tax reveals itself here in our findings for government services. The 
entire decrease of 4% of the budget is not located here, as the remainder is spread out over 
transfers to households and other levels of government, but that negative value is a result of 
our balanced budget closure rule and our decision to impose a sales tax without decimals. The 
remaining results are endogenous and reflect the new equilibrium resulting from the policy 
changes.  
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TABLE 18 – Output by commodity (in millions of dollars) 
 
Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference 
AFFH-C 9,622 10,074 0.36 10,078 0.40 10,046 0.08 
MIN-C 1,734 1,791 0.54 1,791 0.57 1,782 0.04 
MANUF-C 102,187 103,513 0.24 103,515 0.25 103,367 0.10 
MEDIMAN-C 5,475 5,624 0.74 5,626 0.77 5,594 0.20 
UTIL-C 11,745 14,750 2.08 14,753 2.10 14,500 0.35 
FOOD-C 45,098 45,186 0.04 45,202 0.08 45,163 (0.01) 
INFOSER-C 44,652 38,547 (0.33) 38,555 (0.31) 38,644 (0.08) 
HEEDSER-C 49,882 55,160 3.06 55,158 3.06 54,956 2.68 
OTHSER-C 236,884 244,241 (0.32) 244,277 (0.31) 244,613 (0.17) 
CONST-C 33,797 33,308 (1.45) 33,308 (1.45) 33,347 (1.33) 
WHOLTRAD-C 38,985 39,307 0.83 39,308 0.83 39,206 0.57 
RETTRAD-C 32,246 33,215 2.36 33,215 2.36 33,119 2.06 
TRAN-C 26,197 26,999 0.78 26,999 0.78 26,931 0.53 
MOVIE-C 1,214 1,199 (2.27) 1,200 (2.25) 1,216 (0.94) 
GOVSPC-C 77,069 78,029 (2.08) 78,024 (2.09) 78,315 (1.72) 
Average 
  
0.31 
 
0.32 
 
0.16 
 
 
In Tables 18 and 19, we see that there is little difference between the effects by 
commodity and activity, respectively, as the values are quite similar.  As in the case of the 
Special Council simulation, we see negative effects on food, all newly taxed services, and the 
movie industry.  The exception here is in health and education, which sees robust growth.  We 
also note that the utilities industry, which enjoys some new tax advantages, grows fastest.  The 
other notable success is in retail trade, which survives the higher sales tax and apparently 
thrives with the now moderately lower equilibrium wage rate.  The remaining industries are 
unaffected or see moderate growth. The average increase is between 0.16% in the shortest run 
and 0.39% in the long run.  
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TABLE 19 – Output by activity (in millions of dollars) 
  Baseline Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
  
Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference Calculated % Difference 
AFFH-A 9,622 9,659 0.38 9,662 0.42 9,630 0.08 
MIN-A 1,734 1,744 0.57 1,744 0.61 1,734 0.04 
MANUF-A 102,187 102,441 0.25 102,443 0.25 102,294 0.11 
MEDIMAN-A 5,475 5,516 0.76 5,518 0.79 5,486 0.21 
UTIL-A 11,745 12,109 3.09 12,112 3.12 11,847 0.87 
FOOD-A 45,098 45,119 0.04 45,135 0.08 45,096 (0.01) 
INFOSER-A 44,652 44,504 (0.33) 44,513 (0.31) 44,616 (0.08) 
HEEDSER-A 49,882 51,521 3.28 51,519 3.28 51,316 2.87 
OTHSER-A 236,884 236,141 (0.31) 236,176 (0.30) 236,494 (0.16) 
CONST-A 33,797 33,308 (1.45) 33,308 (1.45) 33,347 (1.33) 
WHOLTRAD-A 38,985 39,307 0.83 39,308 0.83 39,206 0.57 
RETTRAD-A 32,246 33,015 2.39 33,015 2.39 32,919 2.09 
TRAN-A 26,197 26,420 0.85 26,421 0.85 26,350 0.59 
MOVIE-A 1,214 1,186 (2.27) 1,187 (2.25) 1,203 (0.93) 
GOVSPC-A 77,069 75,302 (2.29) 75,297 (2.30) 75,607 (1.90) 
Average 
  
0.39 
 
0.40 
 
0.20 
 
 
 If we remove government services from the calculation above to see the growth rates of 
all industries without the artificial decrease we imposed by our inexact budget neutral tax 
change, we have a higher average for the remaining 14 private sector industries. Using this 
measure, the average growth rates vary from 0.29% in the shortest run for commodities, and as 
much as 0.59% for activities in the short run.  Table 18 shows the values for both private sector 
commodity and activity growth rates and their average across treatment. The average of the 
growth rates of both commodities and activities is an arbitrary measure that can be interpreted 
as the growth of the general sector of the economy. 
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TABLE 20 – Average private sector growth rate of commodities and activities 
  Long Run Short Run Shortest Run 
Commodities 0.48 0.49 0.29 
Activities 0.58 0.59 0.35 
Average 0.53 0.54 0.32 
 
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In both of our simulations, we see what one would expect from a modest subnational 
tax reform package that is intended to be revenue neutral: modest effects.  In either simulation, 
the effect on gross state product is measured in basis points. In the Special Council reform, the 
effect on GDP is negligibly positive, while in the income tax elimination simulation the effect is 
negligibly negative.  In both cases, the long run, with mobile and variable capital and labor, has 
a higher GDP than in the shortest run, with activity specific capital and fixed supplies of both 
labor and capital.  This suggests that either reform will cause some growing pains before all 
adjustments are made.   
 In the Special Council’s simulation, Georgia’s wealthier four household groups would be 
wealthier, in the long run, by at least $85, while the poorest five groups are either unaffected or 
poorer by no more than $83 dollars. In the long run, those making less than $50,000 will have 
their utilities decline by less than five basis points, while those making more than $50,000 will 
have their utilities increase by as much as seven basis points. These dollar figures and utility 
changes are so insignificant as to be disregarded in the decision whether or not to institute the 
Special Council reform. 
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 The more extreme hypothetical of replacing the income tax with an expanded uniform 
sales tax reveals the regressivity of the general direction of the more balanced Special Council 
reform. We see the poorest lose 1.5% of their utility while the richest gain 0.3%.  In dollar terms, 
the poorest are hit with a negative equivalent variation greater than the proportion of the new 
sales tax to their taxable income, and the richest benefit by less than 1%. Again, these effects 
are in the direction we would expect in theory, and even the largest swing in utility is small 
enough to perhaps be compensated for by transfers.  However, the total negative equivalent 
variation for the 58% of the population that has a negative value would require more in terms 
of transfers than is gained by the remainder.   
 In the Special Council simulation, industrial output is approximately 0.25% above what it 
would have been, although food, other services, and movie industrial sectors suffer.  The 
remaining industries are unaffected or have output as much as 1.07% higher.  In the income tax 
elimination model, we see more robust growth from our industries than that seen in the Special 
Council simulation, with a bit more than 0.33% increase in the long run.  Furthermore, this 
growth would be 0.5% without inclusion of the artificially low government.   
 As planned, the Special Council’s tax reform is essentially budget neutral, with a shortfall 
of $70 million. This would be diminished by the elimination of the sales tax holiday or other 
unsimulated reforms.  The income tax elimination simulation makes an arbitrary decision to 
allow for a 4% decrease in the size of the state’s budget to avoid an unwieldy 9.2% sales tax. 
This 4% decrease is the approximate size of the simulated corporate income tax relief.   
 The imposition of either tax reform is not unambiguously positive for all participants in 
the economy.  In the Special Council simulation, we see that the GDP and output increase, so 
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we know that this reform expands economic activity.  Furthermore, the welfare gains from 
those with positive equivalent variations are enough to compensate for the losses. Regarding 
the efficacy of the distribution of gains in industry, those industries that had previously 
benefited from exclusions in the tax code suffer when those exclusions are removed and are 
treated like the rest of the sectors under the uniform code.   
 The income tax elimination is a more extreme adjustment and may require additional 
model refinement to draw precise conclusions. However, this approach is considerably more 
regressive than the Special Council’s recommendation. The effect on GDP, the budget, and 
industry output are mixed, with the first being nearly unaffected, the second decreases, and the 
latter increases.     
 Further research may include dynamics to simulate the proposed implementation over 
time to tease out the adjustment path.  Additional attention could also be paid to household 
specific elasticities to try to get more precise measures of magnitude for the household effects. 
Alternative industry aggregations could be considered to observe subsectors of industries that 
are more affected by the reforms.  Finally, one could include additional parameters for the 
feedback effects on individuals regarding transfers received from the government or taxes paid 
as a result of diminished taxable income. 
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CHAPTER THREE: A SIMULATED FUTURE OF EGYPT 
 
Thanks to coauthors: Manal Metwaly, Nour Abdul-Razzak, and Andrew Feltenstein 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are frequently used to simulate fiscal 
policy changes, trade liberalization, or monetary policy actions to estimate the resulting effects 
on economic variables such as growth, income distribution, or deficits. However, the CGE 
framework also allows for inclusion of other exogenous events by altering key parameters after 
calibration. In most cases, this exercise is applied to simulate some minor change to the 
productivity of factors, as in the effect of a drought on an economy by decreasing the 
productivity of land in the agriculture sector, for example. The application of this approach to 
more drastic changes has, in the past, been limited by the unavailability of important data. 
The Egyptian revolution in 2011 provides an interesting opportunity to use this feature 
of CGE models to study a drastic change to an economy. Egypt’s revolution had this type of 
substantial macroeconomic impact by negatively impacting key industries, balance of payments, 
budget deficits, foreign direct investment, and other observable and measurable variables. 
Furthermore, as the revolution took place, the Egyptian bureaucracy continued to collect data 
on the economy. This paper will use pre-revolution historical data for calibration and post-
revolution data to incorporate known exogenous effects of the Egyptian revolution in a 
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dynamic general equilibrium model that endogenously generates tax avoidance behavior. We 
will then simulate the current policy and a fiscal reform in post-revolution Egypt.   
 
II. EGYPT BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 
 
Over the past twenty years, Egypt has transformed its economy.  Beginning in 1991 with 
the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, Egypt restored macroeconomic 
equilibrium by increasing the role of the private sector, relaxing price controls, reducing trade 
restrictions, and taming inflation and budget deficits.  Egypt instituted structural reforms in the 
area of monetary policy in 2000 with abolishment of the de jure exchange rate peg.  It 
introduced a domestic currency overnight interbank market, and a foreign exchange interbank 
market, in 2001 and 2004, respectively.  In 2005, in an effort to control inflation and stabilize 
prices, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) established a ‘corridor system’ with a ceiling and a floor 
for the overnight interest rates on both lending from and deposits to the CBE.  Their goals were 
not met.   According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), inflation at the beginning of the 
decade was under 3%, but by 2008 it had reached 20%.    
 Modest tax reform took place in 2001, with the general sales tax extended to the 
wholesale and retail sectors.  Major reforms were enacted in 2005. The top personal income 
tax rate was decreased from 32% to 20%.  Taxes on corporate profit were cut from 40%, to 20% 
on profits under $10 million EGP, and to 25% on profits above $10 million EGP. Property tax 
rates were cut from 46% to 10%.  Sales taxes were standardized and cut from 46% to 30% for 
luxury goods; 3% to 0% for essential goods; and a uniform rate of 10% for all non-luxury, 
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nonessential goods.  Further restructuring included the consolidation of numerous tax 
collection agencies into a single agency and the implementation of self-assessment of tax 
liability.   
 Following the major fiscal and monetary reforms in 2005, Egypt’s economy tracked in a 
generally positive direction.  Growth rates reached as high as 7.2% before the financial crisis 
triggered a low of 4.7%.  Unemployment fell from a rate of 11.5% in 2005 to 9% in 2010.  The 
debt- to-GDP ratio fell from 103% to 70% in 2008.  Inflation, however, rose from 4.7% to 20.2% 
in the same period.  This inflation is often cited as an instigating factor of the revolution, as the 
poor were hardest hit by rising food prices.   
 In January of 2011, the Egyptian revolution ousted Mubarak from the Presidency of 
Egypt, the office he had held for nearly 30 years.  According to protestors, the revolution was 
largely a political one for democracy, and against police and government corruption.  We 
believe that it is reasonable to assume that Egypt’s new leadership will not drastically alter the 
structure of the economy by nationalizing private companies or pursuing socialist or isolationist 
policies.  For the purpose of our model, we assume that the largely free market economic 
system in Egypt, as it existed prior to the revolution, will continue to exist.    
The direct effects of the revolution on the economy were significant.  During the  
revolution, crime rates rose causing tourism to fall dramatically.  Tourism in 2010 accounted for 
13% of GDP, 11% of total employment, $14 billion in export revenue, and 22% of total exports 
(WTTC, 2010).   According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
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tourism fell by one third in 2011. Outside sources have put the figure as high as 70%11.  After 
the revolution, unemployment increased from 9% to 12.1%; real GDP growth fell from 5.1% to 
1.8%; and Egypt saw its bond ratings downgraded by all three major ratings agencies (EMOP).  
Business starts decreased, consumption fell, and investment decreased.  Quarterly foreign 
direct investment fell from an inflow of nearly $2.5 billion to an outflow of $163 million (MOED).  
Regarding fiscal policy, following the revolution, leaders stipulated a 15% increase in wages and 
pensions for the government sector, and the top marginal income tax rate was increased to 
25%.   
Billions of dollars were pledged by foreign governments to the Egyptian people in the 
form of foreign aid for post-revolution recovery.  Initial infusions of cash and petroleum 
products from Qatar and Saudi Arabia have kept the currency afloat.  The interim military 
government was able to raise funds by selling Egyptian bonds, but the interest rate on a one 
year bond was 16%.  After the June 30, 2012, election of Mohamed Morsi as the new Egyptian 
President, the IMF worked unsuccessfully with the new Egyptian government to set terms of a 
$3.2 billion loan.  Morsi’s first official trip was to Saudi Arabia, where he received $1.75 billion 
in aid.  In the first year after the revolution, foreign exchange reserves fell from $36 billion to 
$15.5 billion, enough to cover three months of imports.   
 In November 2012, President Morsi issued a declaration immunizing his decrees from 
legal challenge.  The president justified this as a move to protect the work of the constitutional 
                                                     
11
 It is difficult to use CAPMAS data for tourism because Tunisian, Libyan, and other refugees cannot be separated 
from tourists.   
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assembly, but instead it set the stage for a second uprising.  The following month, the 
constitution was approved by referendum, despite protests, with approval of 63% of voters.  
The unrest continued until a large protest, scheduled in June 2013, continued until July 3, when 
Egyptian army chief general Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed Morsi from power.  The next day, el-
Sisi named Adly Mansour, a former judge, as Egypt’s interim President, but observers noted 
that el-Sisi was running the country.  In January 2014, a new constitution was enacted with 98% 
approval.  Elections for the Presidency are scheduled for late May 2014, with el-Sisi polling well 
after the March 26th announcement of his candidacy.    
The new Egyptian President will inherit an economy with significant problems.  As a 
result of a lack of security, crime, curfews, and civil unrest, GDP growth fell to an annualized 
rate of 1% in the first quarter of 2014.  GDP forecasts for 2014 range between 2% and 2.5%.  
The deficit is currently at 13% of GDP, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of nearly 90%.  Aid from Saudi 
Arabia and others has kept foreign reserves above the 3 month minimum, but inflation has 
increased over the last few months from a 7.6% annual rate to a monthly rate equal to an 
annual inflation of more than 13%.  Table 1 displays key indicators of the Egyptian economy 
before and after the 2005 tax reforms and the revolution. Inflation continues to rise and 
impede investment and confidence in the stability of the Egyptian economy. Furthermore, 
despite efforts to reduce public spending, public domestic debt has increased to 90% compared 
to an average of 50% in the Middle East and North Africa (Achy, 2010). 
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TABLE 21 – Egyptian Economy Before and After 2005 Tax Reforms and 2011 Revolution 
Year 
Nominal GDP 
(Billion US$) 
Real GDP 
(Billion 
EGP) 
Real GDP 
Growth Rate 
Price 
Index 
(1999 = 
100) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Gov’t 
Debt 
(% of 
GDP) 
2000 100 355 5.4 101.1 1.1 9.0 n/a 
2001 97 367 3.5 103.4 2.3 8.8 n/a 
2002 86 379 3.2 106.2 2.7 10.1 90.4 
2003 81 391 3.2 110.5 4.1 11.3 102.3 
2004 79 407 4.1 123.4 11.7 10.5 101.5 
2005 90 425 4.5 129.2 4.7 11.5 103.3 
2006 107 454 6.8 138.5 7.2 10.9 90.3 
2007 130 487 7.1 150.4 8.6 9.2 80.2 
2008 162 521 7.2 180.7 20.2 8.8 70.2 
2009 189 546 4.7 198.7 10.0 9.5 73.0 
2010 219 574 5.1 220.0 10.7 9.0 73.2 
2011 236 584 1.8 245.9 11.8 12.1 76.6 
2012 262 597 2.2 272.5 10.8 12.3 80.6 
2013 271 609 2.1 289.5 6.2 13.0 89.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014 
**At an exchange rate of $1=£0.155, Egyptian Nominal GDP is approximately £1,753 in 2013. 
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III. EGYPTIAN TAX EVASION AND INFORMAL SECTOR 
 
A. Tax Evasion 
 
  High levels of tax evasion represent serious challenges for many developing nations as 
they seek to grow and expand their public services. Trade liberalization is a significant part of 
many reforms in developing nations.  Consequently, there is a need to increase domestic 
revenues to replace revenues lost to decreased tariffs (Toye, 2000). Furthermore, if taxes are 
too high or too cumbersome to pay, the threat of citizens’ migration to an informal economy 
becomes more likely (Turnovsky and Basher, 2009). Thus, it is in the government’s best interest 
to develop policies that creatively increase tax compliance while promoting economic growth.   
Egypt is an interesting case, as it has transformed itself in the past thirty years from an 
economy dominated by the public sector to a private sector and market-oriented economy 
(Dobronogov et al., 2005). At the same time, Egypt has implemented a series of tax reforms.  
Although many other Arab countries have instituted tax reforms and structural adjustment 
programs, Egypt is the largest and most diverse non-oil based Arab economy to manage such 
extensive reforms. Egypt has seen moderate growth since the implementation of structural 
adjustment programs.  However, following the global financial crisis of 1997 and a domestic 
financial scandal in 1998, Egypt’s economic growth slowed and failed to sustain a high growth 
rate. Prior to the revolution, negative global shocks continued and Egypt’s fiscal situation 
deteriorated with steadily increasing budget deficits.  According to the IMF, fiscal vulnerabilities 
remain as Egypt’s main macroeconomic risk (“Arab Republic of Egypt…” IMF, 2010).  
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Egypt’s tax revenue-to-GDP ratio in 2010 was only 14.1%12, which is relatively low 
compared to other Arab economies of similar size and nature, indicating the need to explore 
policies that curb tax evasion and improve growth rates. Determining the extent to which the 
tax administration in Egypt is a significant constraint on private sector development is vital. A 
survey of 1000 enterprises conducted by the World Bank13 in 2004 found that tax-related issues 
were ranked as severe by almost 80% of participants (“Egypt National Investment…” OECD, 
2006). Tax authority officials are known to exercise significant discretion in applying rules 
related to enterprise regulation and public service access. To complicate matters, tax laws are 
excessively complex, thereby giving more room for the tax authority to act arbitrarily (“Egypt 
Country Profile…” FEMISE, 2004). These issues have led to an underreporting of income, tax 
evasion, and subsequently low revenues for the government. Although there is a dearth of 
literature in this area, the few articles that have explored the cost of tax evasion in Egypt 
conclude that the benefits of tax evasion exceed its costs at this time (El-din et al., 2000)14. An 
analysis done by the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies found that the levels of tax evasion 
in Egypt and other developing nations is a serious issue (Tohamy, 1998). With tax revenue at 
14.1% of GDP in 2010, Egypt’s tax effort is relatively similar to that of the Philippines at 15.7%, 
Indonesia at 15.5%, and Thailand at 15.7% (Gordon and Li, 2009).  Developing nations’ tax 
revenues average about 19.6% of GDP compared to 28.4% in the developed world. However, 
                                                     
12
 Some additional revenue is obtained from Suez Canal fees that is not included in the tax to GDP ratio, but the 
ratio only increases to 16.8% with its inclusion. 
13
 World Bank Investment Climate Survey of Egypt 
14
 El-din, Fawza and Refaat did not determine how tax evasion affects investment quantitatively because of the 
lack of information regarding transactions costs of tax compliance and the magnitude of tax evasion.  
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Egypt’s tax-to-GDP ratio falls well below that of other neighboring Arab countries with similar 
economies, such as Morocco (at 24%), Tunisia (at 21%) and Jordan (at 20%). This further 
emphasizes Egypt’s weak fiscal situation, possibly as a result of high rates of tax evasion.  As 
with many other problems in Egypt, tax evasion was exacerbated by the revolution, when tax 
revenue as a percent of GDP fell to 13.2%.  This put Egypt slightly below Columbia (13.3%) and 
slightly above Uganda (13%).    
Although Egypt was labeled the top tax policy reformer in the world by the Doing 
Business Report of 2008, substantial obstacles remain, especially for small and medium 
enterprises that comprise 80% of Egypt’s GDP. A World Bank Investment Climate Survey from 
2004 found that access to financing and its associated costs are the main reasons for 
constrained investment and growth of small and medium enterprises. Credit in the private 
sector has averaged around 40% of GDP in the past 5 years. Access to bank credit is necessary 
to support growth of the private sector, and it could partially replace self-financing and the now 
absent foreign direct investment. A survey conducted by the Egyptian Center for Economic 
Studies found a mismatch between banks’ excess lending capacity and the volume of loans 
provided to the private sector (Abdel-Kader, 2006). For a majority of firms (70%), the main 
source of financing was the firm’s own funds (retained earnings). 
Despite a large banking system, credit in the private sector remains concentrated 
among large enterprises (“International Bank for Reconstruction…” World Bank, 2010). Over 
half of the credit given to the private sector goes to less than 0.2% of bank clients, according to 
the Central Bank of Egypt. The 2009 Investment Climate Assessment survey found that firm size 
is the most important characteristic associated with whether or not a firm had a loan or 
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overdraft capacity. Reforms have taken place to increase access to credit, including creating a 
new private credit bureau: iScore. Measures were also taken to reduce the minimum capital 
required to start a business, from 50,000 Egyptian pounds to 1,000 Egyptian pounds (Alissa, 
2007). Egypt has strong future growth prospects; however, the low level of private credit to 
businesses and households as a percentage of GDP remains problematic (IMF, 2010).  
 
B. Egyptian Informal Sector 
 
With an estimated 8.2 million people in the informal sector (37% of the workforce), 
there is great opportunity to broaden Egypt’s tax base (World Bank 2010). A USAID report 
found that between the years 1998 to 2006, the informal economy grew at an annual rate of 
5.3% (Alissa, 2007). Furthermore, USAID found that about 40-60% of the cost of doing business 
is result of the cumbersome regulatory framework that promotes the informal economy.  
Very few studies have explored the nature of the informal economy in Egypt. Economist 
Hernando de Soto of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy led years of fieldwork and analysis 
for the Egyptian government to determine how much of the economy operated “extralegally” 
(de Soto, 2011). This notable study concluded that the underground economy was the nation’s 
largest employer in 2004. He found that 9.6 million people worked in the extralegal sector, 
while 6.8 million were employed in the private sector, and 5.9 million in the public sector.  
Furthermore, 92% of Egyptians hold their property without normal legal title. Without any legal 
title to assets and real estate, entrepreneurs cannot leverage these assets as collateral for loans  
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or investment capital. As a result, the majority of enterprises remain small and poor. At 
the time, de Soto estimated the value of these extralegal businesses and properties (in both the 
rural and urban parts of Egypt) to be $248 billion, 6 times greater than total savings and 
deposits in commercial banks in Egypt, and 30 times more than the market value of the 
companies registered in the Cairo Stock Exchange. The survey also identified the primary causes 
for extralegality in Egypt, notably the convoluted and redundant legal requirements for the 
various stages of a firm’s development. The primary cause identified for the difficulty of 
expansion is the lack of access to credit. de Soto’s findings have since been corroborated by 
other Egyptian studies and surveys.  
The Egyptian Labor Market Survey Data for 2006 found that medium and large firms hire 
nearly 25% of their workers informally and thus without a secure contract or social security 
(World Bank, 2010). The 2009 Investment Climate Survey by the World Bank found that 
managers surveyed ranked tax rates, and uncertainty about economic and regulatory policies as 
major constraints to businesses. Furthermore, El-din et al. (2000) found that taxation has a 
major impact on competitiveness and net profitability through its effect on the cost of capital in 
Egypt. They showed that debt financing alleviates the effective tax burden on projects and 
therefore provides an additional incentive to borrow. However, this means of financing new 
investments is not easily accessible to non-corporate businesses or small or medium 
enterprises, as they are unable to provide necessary collateral to the banks. As a result, small 
firms are left with a higher burden of taxation than are large corporations.  
Given these findings, we see that even after the tax reforms of 2005, evasion and 
informality remain key impediments for growth. Many Arab countries have sought taxation 
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reform through improvements in tax administration and institutional reform. Furthermore, 
many countries have instituted full-fledged value added taxes (VAT), with Morocco having one 
of the highest rates in the region. Other Middle East and North African (MENA) tax reforms 
include lowering corporate income tax rates and implementing online systems (Paying Taxes, 
2010). Jordan recently simplified tax forms and introduced an electronic payment system. In 
2009, Tunisia mandated that all companies with a high turnover use the online tax system. Both 
Djibouti and Iran have recently replaced their sales tax with a new value added tax.  
Comparisons within the MENA region have shown the detrimental effects of widespread 
tax evasion and informal economies similar to those found in Egypt. Given the difficult 
economic times, the revolution, and the inefficient tax system, new policies are needed to 
stimulate growth, increase revenues, and increase private sector access to credit. As explained 
below, this model accommodates the large amount of tax evasion and informality as it 
correlates the underground economy to tax rates and the need to access the banking system.   
 
IV. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SPECIFICATION 
 
In this section we develop the formal structure of the dynamic general equilibrium 
model. This is a dynamic model that endogenously generates tax avoidance behavior by firms.  
We will detail the model specifications regarding dynamics, production, banking, consumption, 
government, and the foreign sector. 
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A. Dynamics 
 
Our model is a sequentially dynamic model15 and thus hasn discrete time periods. All 
agents optimize in each period over a 2 period time horizon. That is, in period t  they optimize 
given prices for periods t  and 1t  with expectations for prices for the future after period 1t  . 
When period 2t   arrives, agents re-optimize for period 2t   and 3t  , based on new 
information about period 2t  . Agents have perfect foresight for the next 2 periods, and 
adaptively generate expectations for the future thereafter.  
 
B. Production 
 
There are eight factors of production and three types of financial assets: 
 
1-5. Capital types    
6. Urban labor   
7. Rural labor   
8. Land 
9. Domestic currency 
10. Bank deposits 
11. Foreign currency. 
 
 
 
                                                     
15
 This methodology using discrete time has been in use since early work on inventory policy by Arrow, Harris and 
Marschak (1951) was generalized by Bellman (1953) and contrasts with optimizations done in continuous time.  
This method allows us to calibrate our model before adjusting foreign demand. 
  78  
 
The five types of capital correspond to five aggregate nonagricultural productive sectors: 
 
A. Light Manufacturing    
B. Heavy Industry   
C. Electricity, Water, Sewage   
D. Transport, Hotel 
E. Housing, Health Services. 
 
An input-output matrix, At, is used to determine intermediate and final production in 
period t.  We use a 25 x 25 Egyptian input-output matrix that is described in the next section. 
Corresponding to each sector in the input-output matrix, sector-specific value added is 
produced using capital and urban labor for the nonagricultural sectors, and land and rural 
labor in agriculture. Hence At  may have any dimension, but capital is specific to sectors 
aggregated in the above way. Accordingly, capital is perfectly mobile across a given subsector, 
but is immobile across other subsectors. Labor, on the other hand, may migrate from the rural 
to the urban sector.16  This rural-urban migration is an important feature of the Egyptian 
economy. 
The specific formulation of the firm's problem is as follows. Let j
Kiy ,
j
Liy be the inputs of 
capital and urban labor to the jth nonagricultural sector in period i. Let 
GiY be the outstanding 
stock of government infrastructure in period i. The production of value added in sector j in 
period i is then given by: 
 ( , , ) 
j j
ji ji Ki Li Giva va y y Y  (14) 
                                                     
16
 We assume that the labor market is not segmented and there is no wage differential between workers in the 
underground and the formal economy. 
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where public infrastructure may act as a productivity increment to private production.  
Sector j pays income taxes on inputs of capital and labor, given by ,  Kij Lijt t  respectively, 
in period i. The interpretation of these taxes is that the capital tax is a tax on firm profits, while 
the labor tax is a personal income tax that is withheld at source. 
We suppose that each type of sector capital is produced via a sector-specific investment 
technology that uses inputs of capital and labor to produce new capital. Investment is carried 
out by the private sector and is entirely financed by domestic borrowing.  
Let us define the following notation: 
HiC   = The cost of producing the quantity H of capital C of a particular type in period i.  
ir      = The interest rate r in period i. 
KiP  = The return to capital in period i. 
MiP   = The price of money in period i.  
i  = The rate of depreciation of capital. 
Suppose, then, that the rental price of capital in period 1 is
1P . If 1HC  is the cost-
minimizing cost of producing the quantity of capital,
1H , then the cost of borrowing must equal 
the present value of the return on new capital. Hence: 
 
2
1
1 1
2
1
(1 )
(1 )
in
Ki
H i
i
j
j
P H
C
r
 



 
 

 
 
 
 


   (15) 
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where is the interest rate in period j, given by: 
 1/j Bjr P  (16) 
 
where PBj is the price of a bond in period j. The tax on capital is implicitly included in the 
investment problem, as capital taxes are paid on capital as an input to production.  
The decision to invest depends not only on the variables in the above equation, but also 
upon the decision the firm makes as to whether it should pay taxes. This decision determines 
the firm’s entry into the underground economy. We assume that the firm’s decision is based 
upon a comparison of the tax rate on capital with the rate of return on new capital. If the tax 
rate on capital is less than the corresponding rate of return, the firm pays the full tax. If the tax 
rate is greater than the return to new capital, then the firm pays less than the full capital tax. 
That is, it withdraws, at least partially, into the underground economy.  
Formally, in a two period world, suppose that: 
 
2
1
11
K
K
P
t
r


 (17) 
such that the present value of the return on one unit of new capital is greater than the current 
tax rate on capital. In this case, we assume the investor pays the full tax rate on capital inputs. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that: 
 
2
1
11
K
K
P
t
r


 (18) 
Here the discounted rate of return is less than the tax rate on capital, and the firm will attempt 
to reduce its tax payments by moving into the underground economy. The extent to which the 
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firm goes into the underground economy is determined by the gap between the tax rate and 
the rate of return to investment. That is, the tax rate of the firm is 
1Kt  where: 
 
2
1
2
1 1
1
1
1
K
K
K K
K
P
t
r
t t
t

  
  
   
  
  
  
 (19) 
Here 0   and higher values of   lead to lower values of taxes actually paid. That is, the ratio 
1
1
K
K
t
t
 reflects the share of the sector that operates in the above-ground economy.  Hence   
represents a firm-specific behavioral variable. An “honest” firm would set 0  , while a firm 
that is prone to evasion would have a high value for . We should note that the firm does not 
actually pay a “rate” lower than the statutory rate.  Rather, it under-reports its income so that 
the effective tax rate paid is   ̅  .  If a sector can avoid paying taxes, as above, by going into the 
underground economy, why does it pay taxes at all? That is, why does it simply not set
1 0Kt  ? 
In the next section we develop a simple approach that supposes that a firm’s refusal to pay 
taxes reduces its ability to borrow from the commercial banking system. Thus, a firm’s desire to 
invest will constrain its evasion of tax payments. 
 Suppose that the firm carries out this strategy of reducing tax payments, based on its 
honesty coefficient. We suppose that the firm’s goal is to maximize the real value of capital 
stock in its final period, T.  Accordingly, the firm wishes to maximize  ̅   where: 
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(20) 
and      is the consumer price index in period T. 
 
C. Banking 
 
The banking sector in our model is quite simple and is meant to capture some of the key 
features and problems in Egypt as well as many other developing countries. We will suppose 
that there is one bank for each nonagricultural sector of the economy. There are five such 
sectors, and hence five banks, corresponding to each of the sectors in the aggregate national 
income accounts. Such sector specialization of the banking system reflects the reality of many 
developing countries.  
Each bank lends primarily to the sector with which it is associated. The banks are, 
however, not fully specialized in their corresponding sector. We make the simplifying 
assumption that each bank holds a fixed share of the outstanding debt of its particular sector. It 
then holds additional fixed shares of the debt of each of the remaining sectors.  We make this 
assumption of diversification of assets in order to allow for a situation in which a firm that 
evades taxes, and thereby enters the underground economy, might receive varying degrees of 
credit rationing from the different banks to which it applies for loans. 
We choose a simple approach to determine the degree of credit rationing that firms 
face. Our premise is that banks have no direct way of knowing whether specific firms operate in 
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the underground economy. We assume that banks only care about the estimated amount of 
capital the firm may have. If the firm defaults on its loan, then this represents the best estimate 
of the amount that the bank could seize. The bank would, presumably, be willing to lend an 
amount equal to at least the firm’s estimated capital. If the firm requests a loan larger than its 
estimated capital, the bank may choose to grant the full loan, or it may choose to restrict the 
loan amount. This restriction would depend, in turn, upon the bank’s degree of risk aversion.    
How can the bank estimate the value of the firm’s capital if this information is not 
directly revealed by the firm? We assume the borrower is required to show the bank his tax 
returns in order to obtain a loan. There is a single, flat corporate tax rate that the borrowing 
firm faces. Hence, suppose that 
1KT  represents taxes actually paid by the borrower in period 1. 
This is known to the bank, as the potential borrower is required to present his tax returns. Thus, 
if the borrower is in full compliance with his tax obligation, and hence carried out no 
underground activity, the value of his capital,
1Kˆ , would be given by: 
 
 
1
1
1
ˆ K
K
T
K
t
  (21)
 
 
 
Accordingly, the bank would be willing to lend at least 1Kˆ  to the borrower, as this would 
represent a minimum estimate of the value of the firm’s capital, which could be seized in the  
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event of a default.17 Suppose, however, that the amount the firm wishes to borrow, , as in 
equation (15), such that: 
 
 1 1
ˆ
HC K  (22)  
In this case the bank lends an amount
1L , where 1 1HL C , as the bank would not be able to 
seize the full value of the loan in the case of a default. The situation we have described would, 
in the case of perfect certainty, prompt credit rationing when the estimated value of the firm’s 
capital is less than its loan request. If the firm’s capital is greater than its loan request, there 
would be no credit rationing. 
In a more realistic case of uncertainty about both the true value of the firm, as well as 
about the bank’s own ability to seize the firm, one might expect the lending process to be 
somewhat different. Accordingly, we will suppose that a simple functional form determines 
bank lending as a function of the amount requested as well as the estimated value of the firm’s 
capital. We define the amount the bank lends,
1L , as: 
 
1
11
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
1
H
H H
H
H
K
KC
L C C
K C K
C

 
   
    
    
 
 (23) 
                                                     
17
 We have not explicitly incorporated bankruptcies and defaults in this model, for the sake of simplicity. However, 
bankruptcies and corresponding bank contractions can be introduced as in Ball and Feltenstein (2001) and Blejer, 
Feldman, and Feltenstein (2002). 
1HC
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 Here   represents a measure of risk aversion by the bank. If 0  , there are no credit 
restrictions, and the bank ignores estimates of the borrower’s estimated net worth.  As   rises, 
the bank increasingly restricts lending if the term in brackets is less than 1. If the firm pays no 
taxes, hence operating entirely in the underground economy,
1
ˆ 0K   and hence
1 0L  , that is 
there is no lending. If 1
1
ˆ
H
K
C
 increases, as would be the case if the value of the firm increases 
relative to its borrowing request, then 
1 1HL C , that is, the bank lends the full value of the 
request.   
Thus, if a firm operates entirely in the underground economy it will not be able to 
borrow to finance investment. If banks are highly risk averse, they will never lend more than a 
firm’s estimated net worth, which is based on its tax return. This tax return, therefore, 
represents all the information the bank needs in order to determine its response to a request 
for a loan. 
 
D.  Consumption 
 
There are two types of consumers, representing rural and urban labor.18 We further 
divide the two consumer categories into quintiles. We suppose that each of the now ten 
representative consumers has differing Cobb-Douglas demands. The consumers also differ in 
                                                     
18
 We use two consumer categories in order to correspond to available country data classifications, as described in 
the next section. 
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their initial allocations of factors and financial assets. Cobb-Douglas parameters, as well as 
factor and asset allocations, are parameterized according to the SAM. There is no 
differentiation between quintiles of either urban or rural labor in the production function; so, 
to a firm, there are only two sources of labor, rather than the ten we have simulated for 
consumer income analysis.    
The consumers maximize intertemporal utility functions, which have as arguments the 
levels of consumption and leisure in each of the two periods. We permit rural-urban migration, 
which depends upon the relative rural and urban wage rate. The consumers maximize these 
utility functions subject to intertemporal budget constraints. The consumer saves by holding 
money, domestic bank deposits, and foreign currency. He requires money for transactions 
purposes, but his demand for money is sensitive to changes in the inflation rate. The consumer 
pays taxes on his consumption, and does not have any direct contact with the underground 
economy. That is, he pays the full nominal rates under all circumstances19.   
 
E.  Government 
 
The government collects personal income, corporate profit, and value-added taxes, as 
well as import duties. It pays for the production of public goods, as well as for subsidies. In 
                                                     
19
 Refer to Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein for the specific form or the consumer’s problem. 
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addition, the government must cover both domestic and foreign interest obligations on public 
debt. The central government deficit is defined by:20 
 
 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1F FD G S rB r e B T      (24) 
where,  
D1 = government deficit in period 1, 
G1 = spending on goods and services in period 1,  
S1 = subsidies given in period 1,  
r1 B0 = interest obligations on the stock of domestic debt, 
rF1 e1BF0 = interest obligations on the stock of foreign debt, 
T1 = tax revenue in period 1. 
 
Note that the tax revenue is partially determined by the degree to which firms enter or exit the 
formal sector. 
The resulting deficit is financed by a combination of monetary expansion, as well as 
domestic and foreign borrowing.  
 
 
2 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 2( ) ( )BG F F FD G S r y B e r C B T         (25) 
where, 
D2 = government deficit in period 2, 
                                                     
20
 As before, 1 denotes period i and 2 denotes period i+1. 
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G2 = spending on goods and services in period 2,  
S2 = subsidies given in period 1,  
2 1 0( )BGr y B  = interest on initial domestic debt stock plus period 1 borrowing, 
2 2 1 0( )F F Fe r C B  = interest on initial foreign debt stock plus period 1 foreign borrowing,  
T2 = tax revenue in period 2. 
 
The government finances its budget deficit by a combination of monetization, domestic 
borrowing, and foreign borrowing. We assume that foreign borrowing in period i, CFi, is 
exogenously determined by the lender. The government then determines the face value of its 
bond sales in period i, ΔyBGi, and finances the remainder of the budget deficit by monetization. 
Hence: 
 i Bi BGi Mi Mi i FiD P y P y eC       (26)    
 
F.  The Foreign Sector 
 
The foreign sector is represented by a simple export equation in which aggregate 
demand for exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices, as well as world 
income. The specific form of the export equation is: 
 
1
0 1 2n wi
i Fi
X y
e

 

 
    
  
 (27) 
where,  
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ΔXno = change in the dollar value of exports in period i,  
πi = inflation in the domestic price index,  
 ie = percentage change in the exchange rate,  
πFi = foreign rate of inflation,  
Δywi = percentage change in world income, denominated in dollars,  
σ1 = real foreign income elasticity, 
σ2 = real exchange rate elasticity of export demand. 
 
The combination of the export equation and domestic supply responses determines 
aggregate exports. Demand for imports is endogenous and is derived from the domestic 
consumers' maximization problems. Foreign lending is assumed to be exogenous. Thus, gross 
capital inflows are exogenous, but the overall change in reserves is endogenous. Finally, we will 
suppose that the exchange rate is fixed. 
 
V. DATA SOURCES  
 
In order to simulate our model we have used a variety of data sources and parameter 
estimates for Egypt.  We will first describe the sources of data regarding production, 
consumption, effective tax rates, initial stocks, and the estimation of behavioral equations 
before we turn to the implementation of the model.  
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A. Production 
 
The input-output structure of intermediate and final production is derived from the 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) from 2008.  This SAM was provided by Cairo University and is 
the product of the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS)21.  
Our input-output matrix is aggregated to 25 x 25 with an additional row and column for foreign 
trade.  
 Real value added per unit output for each of the 25 domestic sectors is derived from 
the corresponding shares of wages and gross operating surpluses in each sector's value added.  
The government is assumed to have a Cobb-Douglas production function whose coefficients are 
those of the aggregate economy.  Finally, in the absence of direct estimation of investment 
functions, we have taken the functions to be the same for each type of capital.  The coefficients 
of these functions are taken to be those of the value added function for the construction 
industry. Even though the functions are the same, it does not imply that the levels of 
investment in the different capital types will be identical. This is because investment depends 
on the interest rate and the rate of return to capital, which may differ across capital types. 
 
  
                                                     
21
 See Appendix E for information regarding the Egyptian SAM. 
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B. Effective Tax Rates 
 
 We use direct sources from Egypt for our tax structures.  Sources include: Law of 
customs Duties No66 of year 1963, Social Insurance Law no 79 for 1975, Law of Stamp Duties 
No 111 of year 1980, Law of Sales Taxes No 11 of year 1991 and No 2 of year 1997, Law of 
Income Taxes No 91 of year 2005, Treasury Bill Law No 114 for 2008, Decree of Ministry of 
Finance no 157 for 2010, Social Insurance Law No 135 of year 2010, Sales Tax Law 49 for 2011.22 
 
C. Consumption  
 
There are two domestic consumer categories in our model: urban and rural.  Each of 
these consumer groups is divided into quintiles for consumer income analysis. We take 
consumption weights on each of the 26 input-output goods (including foreign trade) as the 
expenditure shares in the input-output matrix.  We assume that there is a single foreign 
consumer, representing the rest of the world.  These consumers’ demand weights are given by 
export expenditure shares.   
 
D. Initial stocks 
                                                     
22
 Our late colleague Manal Metwaly of Cairo University was instrumental in helping us overcome the language 
barrier to collect this data. 
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In our simulations, all initial allocations of factors and financial assets are taken to be 
stocks at the end of 2008.  Stocks of urban and rural labor are obtained by applying the shares 
of income going to urban and rural labor by quintile (derived from the Egypt SAM) to 2008 
Egyptian GDP. Money stocks are taken as M2 for 2008, while initial holdings of interest bearing 
assets are taken as total government domestic debt, all derived from Central Bank of Egypt’s 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Foreign assets are taken from the same source.  The stock of land is 
taken to be the real value added to agriculture and is taken from the Egypt SAM as the gross 
operating surplus of the agricultural sector in 2008.  Finally, capital stocks are determined as 
the gross operating surpluses of the corresponding aggregate sectors in the Egyptian SAM.   
 
E. Estimation of Behavioral Equations 
 
Here are the estimations of the behavioral parameters of money demand and export 
supply for the Egyptian economy.  An export demand equation is not estimated here due to 
Egypt’s small share in the world trade.  We use estimation techniques that have been used in 
the past for other developing countries. 
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The demand for money is taken from El-Shazly, 2009. The specific form we use is the 
long run demand for real broad money 
 (    )                        
         
                  (28) 
 
The terms on the right hand side of the equation are:  
   = real income,  
  
  = domestic interest rate, 
  
 
 = foreign interest rate,  
   = real exchange rate,  
   = inflation rate.  
 
All of these are generated within our simulations, with the foreign interest rate being 
exogenous. 
For the export supply equation, we use Ikram, 2006, in which an Egyptian export price 
elasticity of -1.03 is given, while the world income demand elasticity is approximately 1.0.  We 
assume that total world expenditure on Egyptian exports is divided into demand for the input-
output goods according to the shares of exports from each sector in the SAM. 
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VI. SIMULATIONS 
 
 There are three simulations that we refer to as: baseline, revolution, and revolution with 
tax cut.  The model is calibrated to the Egyptian economic data for the years 2008—the year of 
the SAM, to 2010—the year for the national accounts, and using some new data from 2011 and 
onward regarding tax changes.  The baseline model includes no exogenous changes to any 
variables or implementation of alternative policies.  The revolution simulation includes a 70% 
decrease in the foreign demand for those industries that were hit hardest by the revolution: 
tourism, transportation, hotels and restaurants, as well as trade and finance.  This adjustment is 
conducted for a single time period to isolate the effect of the foreign trade aspect of the 
revolution in that year and on the long term growth path.  The final simulation, revolution with 
tax cut, is identical to the revolution treatment except the corporate income tax is reduced by 
25% for the duration of the model to study the effects of the revolution on the economy with 
an alternative fiscal policy that encourages higher tax compliance. 
 
VII. RESULTS 
 
 In analyzing these results we look at the macroeconomic effects on the economy and 
the government’s budget, the effects on consumers’ utility and income, and the effects on the 
sectors’ participation in the formal economy.  
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A. Gross Domestic Product 
 
 Regarding the growth rate, in Figure 1 we find that our model, absent the revolution, 
predicts a return to the robust growth rates seen in the 2005-2010 time period when our SAM 
was built.  However, Figures 1 and 2 reveal that with the revolution the real GDP growth rate is 
4.3% less than the baseline in the absence of the lower tax on capital.  With the lower 
corporate income tax rate, we see a 3% net decrease from the higher growth path.  The long 
run effect on GDP of the one-year change in foreign demand is that, five years after the 
revolution, real GDP is diminished by 3.25%.  The effect on GDP is lessened by a more robust 
growth path in the presence of a cut in corporate income taxes.   
 
FIGURE 1 – Real GDP Growth Rates 
 
 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline 4.15% 2.38% 10.42% 8.84% 8.09% 9.07% 5.21%
Revolution 4.15% -1.88% 10.56% 8.62% 8.40% 9.40% 5.67%
Revolution and Tax Cut 4.01% -0.61% 10.05% 9.76% 8.00% 9.49% 5.61%
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0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
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FIGURE 2 – Normalized Real GDP Growth Rate 
 
 
B. Inflation 
 
 Regarding inflation, our simulation results again show a return to the high inflation 
found in 2008-10 during the time our data was extracted and inflation averaged 13.6%.  Our 
baseline inflation rate averages 10.9% and ranges from 5% to 17.4%.  Inflation in the course of 
the revolution simulation is lower, with an average of 10.6%, while the final treatment, 
including the tax cut, shows an average inflation rate of 11.5%.   Figure 3 reveals the increasing 
inflation and the effect of the revolution and tax cut on inflation over the duration of the 
simulation. 
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FIGURE 3 – Annual Inflation Rates 
 
 
C. Budget 
 
 Figure 4 shows that the revolution has a negligible effect on tax collections as a percent 
of GDP, although they are slightly lower as a result of decreased tax revenues from the effected 
sectors of the economy, but this effect is offset by the smaller economy in that simulation.  As 
we would expect, the lower tax rate on corporations does diminish the tax revenue as a percent 
of the overall economy.  However, the decrease in revenue is not the absolute amount that a 
static analysis would reveal, as additional firms enter the formal economy and begin paying 
taxes on their capital in order to access capital markets.  Figure 4 also shows that the model 
predicts a slight increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio from approximately 19% to a bit less than 21%.   
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline 4.95% 5.10% 9.79% 11.68% 12.43% 15.75% 17.39%
Revolution 4.95% 5.74% 9.71% 10.85% 12.50% 16.71% 14.90%
Revolution and Tax Cut 5.32% 6.67% 9.87% 12.71% 12.58% 18.45% 15.18%
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FIGURE 4 – Tax Revenue to GDP Ratio 
 
 
Regarding deficits, we see the government running increasingly large deficits into the 
future (Figure 5).  The problem of the deficit is exacerbated by the revolution and further 
compounded by the tax cut.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline 18.9% 19.8% 19.8% 19.9% 20.3% 20.4% 20.8% 20.9%
Revolution 18.9% 19.8% 19.9% 20.0% 20.3% 20.5% 20.8% 20.9%
Revolution and Tax Cut 17.6% 18.5% 18.8% 18.8% 19.1% 19.1% 19.4% 19.5%
17.0%
18.0%
19.0%
20.0%
21.0%
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FIGURE 5 – Deficit as a Percent of GDP 
 
 
D. Consumers 
 
 In Table 2, we see the real incomes of the ten consumer groups in period 8.  Consumers 
1-5 are urban, consumers 6-10 are rural, and the poorest quintiles are 1 and 6.  The first thing 
to note is that urban consumers are considerably wealthier than their rural counterparts. In fact, 
all but the poorest urban quintile are richer than the richest rural quintile.  We also see that the 
simulated revolution affects urban consumers especially hard, while rural consumers are 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Baseline -5.50% -4.60% -15.40% -14.20% -21.40% -21.70% -24.40% -27.30%
Revolution -5.50% -4.60% -15.90% -15.10% -22.90% -23.50% -25.90% -28.50%
Revolution and Tax Cut -6.90% -6.10% -17.00% -16.60% -23.90% -25.00% -27.90% -30.70%
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
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actually helped, though the high percentages are an artifact of their low base. This result occurs 
because the diminished foreign demand almost exclusively affects urban labor, provided by 
urban consumers. The diminished demand for goods produced using urban labor results in a 
diminished relative urban wage.  We also see that the increased growth provided by the lower 
tax rate on capital brings urban consumers back to the baseline while increasing the gains made 
by rural consumers. 
 
TABLE 22 – Real income in period 8 by consumer  
 
Baseline Revolution Revolution with Tax Cut 
 
Income Income % Change Income % Change 
Urban      
Consumer 1 14.6 13.8 -5.33% 14.6 -0.02% 
Consumer 2 21.3 20.1 -5.36% 21.3 -0.04% 
Consumer 3 26.5 25.2 -5.23% 26.6 0.09% 
Consumer 4 35.2 33.5 -4.92% 35.4 0.40% 
Consumer 5 76.6 74.3 -3.03% 78.3 2.26% 
Rural      
Consumer 6 3.5 3.9 13.34% 4.1 18.38% 
Consumer 7 4.9 5.5 12.30% 5.8 17.37% 
Consumer 8 6.1 6.8 11.96% 7.1 17.01% 
Consumer 9 7.6 8.5 11.63% 8.9 16.69% 
Consumer 10 19.6 21.3 8.36% 22.2 13.00% 
 
In Table 3, we see the utility values in period 8 relative to the baseline, which is 
normalized to 100.  Again, we see in the revolution simulation that rural consumers gain from 
the increased relative wage rate and urban consumers suffer.  However, with the inclusion of 
the tax cuts, losses for urban consumers are largely diminished or reversed, while rural 
consumers have increased gains.   
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TABLE 23 – Utility in period 8 by consumer 
 
Baseline Revolution Revolution with Tax Cut 
Consumer Utility Utility %  Change Utility %  Change 
Urban 
     Consumer 1 100.0 88.8 -11.2% 95.2 -4.8% 
Consumer 2 100.0 92.3 -7.7% 98.5 -1.5% 
Consumer 3 100.0 93.8 -6.2% 99.9 -0.1% 
Consumer 4 100.0 95.0 -5.0% 101.0 1.0% 
Consumer 5 100.0 98.9 -1.1% 104.7 4.7% 
Rural 
     Consumer 6 100.0 121.2 21.2% 127.3 27.3% 
Consumer 7 100.0 120.8 20.8% 126.7 26.7% 
Consumer 8 100.0 121.6 21.6% 127.3 27.3% 
Consumer 9 100.0 121.9 21.9% 127.6 27.6% 
Consumer 10 100.0 116.3 16.3% 120.9 20.9% 
 
 
E. Formal Sector 
 
 Our final variable of interest is the level to which sectors are entering or leaving the 
formal sector of the economy.  Figures 6 and 7 show the percentage participation of each 
capital sector in the formal economy relative to the baseline for the two alternative treatments.  
In Figure 6, we see that Heavy Industry and Electricity, Water, and Sewage decrease their levels 
of compliance and thus operate in the informal sector at a greater rate as a result of the 
revolution.  The other industries are not affected. 
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FIGURE 6 – Tax Compliance Relative to the Baseline: Revolution 
 
 Figure 7 shows the effect on participation in the formal economy of the capital sectors 
relative to the baseline in the final treatment.  Here we see that, despite the revolution, the 
decreased tax on capital has an unambiguously positive impact on participation in the formal 
economy, as all capital sectors operate in the formal sector at an equal or greater rate. This 
affirms our theory’s prediction, given that the lower tax rate increases the return to capital, and 
thus makes borrowing capital and paying taxes to verify assets more attractive.  Also of note is 
that transportation and light manufacturing are not affected in either simulation.   
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FIGURE 7 – Tax Compliance Relative to the Baseline: Revolution with Tax Cut 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
  
 From the treatments, we see the long run negative effects and consequences of the 
revolution on the Egyptian economy.  We also see that some of the negative effects can be 
mitigated by implementing a lower tax on capital and drawing more economic activity into the 
formal economy.  We expect the economic impact of the revolution to be particularly hard on 
urban workers, as their industries were hardest hit by diminished foreign demand for those 
goods that they produced.  We also expect macroeconomic trends to worsen as the duration of 
2 4 6 8
Light Manufacturing 0% 0% 0% 0%
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Electricity, Water, Sewage 16% 2% 9% 3%
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the revolution lengthens beyond our single time period simulation.  One important policy 
implication of this research is that a significant portion of the economic damage done by the 
revolution could be mitigated with increased investment spurred by a lower corporate tax rate.  
However, this would exacerbate some budgetary pressures, though not by the amount 
indicated by a static analysis, as tax compliance and growth would both be greater. 
 Extensions of this research may include alternative monetary policies or more 
comprehensive fiscal policies.  Future researcher may also consider alternative uses of the large 
foreign aid packages being pledged to Egypt. The most obvious extension would expand the 
shock of the revolution to include multiple time periods representing specific years and 
calibrated to new data on the Egyptian economy. This analysis may include a comparison of 
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions about the return of foreign demand.    
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CHAPTER FOUR:  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The objective of this research was to investigate the effects of alternative fiscal policies 
on growth, welfare, and budgets in two interesting and very different cases and then contrast 
the variations in methodology and findings of the two applications. Regarding the findings, in 
Georgia we found that a revenue neutral tax reform in direction of greater efficiency negligibly 
improved gross state product and had a negligibly regressive impact on households, while a 
more drastic tax reform in the same direction negligibly decreased state product and had a 
significantly regressive impact on households. We found that the effects on industries of 
implementing a uniform tax harms those who had paid a below average rate and helps those 
who had paid an above average rate, but that in the more drastic tax reform the magnitude of 
the effects is greater with a net positive effect on output greater than we found in the milder 
reform.  
 In Egypt, we found that the effects of a brief decrease in the foreign demand for tourism 
related industries has long lasting consequences. The negative effects of the foreign demand 
decrease can be better absorbed by an economy with a lower corporate income tax and the 
resulting larger formal sector.  We also find that the effects of the revolution hit the relatively 
richer urban households significantly harder than the poorer rural households.  
 Contrasting the findings on growth in the two applications, we can see that the lower 
taxes in have an ambiguous effect: Egyptian GDP growth rates are improved in just as many 
years as they are decreased, while in Georgia the growth rates are positive in the modest 
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reform and negative in the more comprehensive reform.  We also see that the tax changes in 
Egypt are significantly progressive while the tax changes in Georgia are mildly regressive.      
 Regarding the designs, we show the flexibility of the methodology for adapting to 
sensitive analysis of tax reform in a stable economy or for comparing alternative futures in light 
of a regime change. We approached this by presenting various decisions modelers face in the 
including the level of policy control, trading circumstances, economic stability, etc.  We present 
the basic alternatives available, which we chose for our purposes, why, and how.   
 This research extends the existing literature in a number of ways.  The analysis of 
Georgia models the joint effects of a tax reform package that includes adjustments to the 
personal and corporate income tax, the sales tax, and taxes on intermediate goods in a regional 
CGE model. No previous study has examined this combination of fiscal changes.  The model also 
utilizes a unique aggregation of industries to isolate industry specific tax changes and the 
consequent adjustments to output by industry.  We also look at the effects of an incremental 
step towards an income tax elimination compared to the complete elimination.  We simulate 
the short and long run effects of each policy to analyze the adjustment paths relative to the 
mobility and flexibility of factors.  Finally, we extend the basic framework of the model 
originally developed by Lofgren, et al. and present the calibration techniques and code for 
future modelers. 
 In Egypt, we apply an existing CGE model involving tax evasion to simulate the future 
growth path for Egypt after a decrease in foreign demand using the newest SAM data available.  
No previous study has been published studying the post revolution Egyptian economy in this 
manner. We look at the immediate and long run effects of the fall in foreign demand on 
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macroeconomic variables and on the welfare of urban and rural quintiles.  We study the effects 
of the resulting also simulate the regime change in alternative fiscal policy environments to 
compare macroeconomic indicators. 
 Finally, this comparison of computable general equilibrium models in very different 
economies may serve as a useful guide to future modelers interested in a fiscal policy 
application. In the literature, this methodology has been used primarily for trade analysis and 
environmental applications such as carbon emissions. However, this methodology is equally 
useful in fiscal policy analysis, evaluation, and comparison.  With what we hope is a useful 
contrast of CGE application in very different economies, some future modeler may encroach on 
the private sector and think-tank dominance of CGE fiscal policy analysis.   
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A – INCOME TAX CALIBRATION CHECK 
 
 In Appendix Table A1, note that the difference between the ratio of the reformed tax 
rate to the statutory tax rate and the ratio of the baseline tax rate to the simulated tax rate is 
near zero.  This is a check to confirm that we are accurately simulating the tax reform. 
 
TABLE A1- Check for accuracy of income tax calibration 
  HHD1 HHD2 HHD3 HHD4 HHD5 HHD6 HHD7 HHD8 HHD9 
Baseline ty 0.50% 0.20% 1.20% 2.00% 2.30% 3.20% 3.50% 3.70% 3.70% 
Simulation ty 0.30% 0.20% 1.10% 1.90% 2.00% 2.40% 2.60% 2.70% 2.50% 
Statutory (Single) 1.30% 2.70% 4.00% 4.60% 5.00% 5.30% 5.50% 5.70% 5.90% 
Statutory (M2K) 0.00% 0.50% 2.30% 3.40% 4.20% 4.80% 5.10% 5.40% 5.80% 
Average (Statutory) 0.70% 1.60% 3.20% 4.00% 4.60% 5.10% 5.30% 5.50% 5.80% 
Reform (Single) 0.80% 2.40% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 
Reform (M2K) 0.00% 0.00% 2.10% 3.80% 3.70% 3.80% 3.80% 3.90% 4.00% 
Average (Reform) 0.40% 1.20% 3.10% 3.90% 3.80% 3.90% 3.90% 3.90% 4.00% 
Ratio (Reform/Stat) 0.624 0.735 0.962 0.978 0.837 0.769 0.74 0.714 0.685 
Baseline income tax rate 5.20% 1.30% 3.40% 4.00% 4.00% 4.30% 4.80% 5.00% 7.20% 
Simulation income tax rate 3.30% 1.00% 3.30% 4.00% 3.30% 3.30% 3.50% 3.50% 5.00% 
Ratio (Baseline/Sim) 0.629 0.74 0.967 0.985 0.839 0.77 0.74 0.713 0.684 
Difference 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.001 0 -0.001 0 
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APPENDIX B - SPECIAL COUNCIL SIMULATION GAMS CODE 
*Income Tax (SG/TOTAL)   
ty('SGOVNE','HHD1')=   .00317; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD2')=   .00154; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD3')=   .01135; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD4')=   .01938; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD5')=   .01966; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD6')=   .02427; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD7')=   .02596; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD8')=   .02670; 
ty('SGOVNE','HHD9')=   .02538; 
 
*Sales Tax   (GA Sales Tax Rate expanded to untaxed sectors until rate is 4%) 
tq("AFFH-C") =              0.0; 
tq("MIN-C") =               0.0; 
tq("MANUF-C") =           0.0; 
tq("MEDIMAN-C") =          0.0; 
tq("UTIL-C") =              0.0; 
tq("FOOD-C") =              0.034293; 
tq("INFOSER-C") =          0.010062; 
tq("HEEDSER-C") =          0.0; 
tq("OTHSER-C") =           0.021532; 
tq("CONST-C") =            0.0; 
tq("WHOLTRAD-C") =         0.0; 
tq("RETTRAD-C") =         0.0; 
tq("TRAN-C") =             0.0; 
tq("MOVIE-C") =             0.0; 
tq("GOVSPC-C") =           0.0; 
 
*Intermediate Inputs Tax 
tq_inp("UTIL-A","AFFH-C") =   -.04; 
tq_inp("UTIL-A","MIN-C") =  -.04; 
tq_inp("UTIL-A","MANUF-C") =  -.04; 
tq_inp(A ,"HEEDSER-C") =   .04; 
tq_inp("MOVIE-A" ,"MOVIE-C") =  .04; 
 
*Corporate Income Tax 
taxc("SGOVNE","CAP")=   .004427*.66; 
 
APPENDIX C - INCOME TAX ELIMINATION GAMS CODE  
*Income Tax (SG/TOTAL)   
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ty('SGOVNE',H)=   0 
 
*Sales Tax   (GA Sales Tax Rate increased to a uniform 9% rate) 
tq("AFFH-C") =              0.05; 
tq("MIN-C") =               0.05; 
tq("MANUF-C") =           0.05; 
tq("MEDIMAN-C") =          0.05; 
tq("UTIL-C") =              0.05; 
tq("FOOD-C") =              0.084293; 
tq("INFOSER-C") =          0.060062; 
tq("HEEDSER-C") =          0.05; 
tq("OTHSER-C") =           0.071532; 
tq("CONST-C") =            0.05; 
tq("WHOLTRAD-C") =         0.05; 
tq("RETTRAD-C") =         0.05; 
tq("TRAN-C") =             0.05; 
tq("MOVIE-C") =             0.05; 
tq("GOVSPC-C") =           0.05; 
 
 
*Intermediate Inputs Tax (Tax treatment of intermediate inputs is identical to Special 
Council *simulation with the exception of the rate increase) 
tq_inp("UTIL-A","AFFH-C") =   -.04; 
tq_inp("UTIL-A","MIN-C") =  -.04; 
tq_inp("UTIL-A","MANUF-C") =  -.04; 
tq_inp(A ,"HEEDSER-C") =    .09; 
tq_inp("MOVIE-A" ,"MOVIE-C") =   .09; 
 
*Corporate Income Tax 
taxc("SGOVNE","CAP")=   .004427*0; 
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APPENDIX D – GEORGIA SAM 
 
 The Georgia 2010 Social Accounting Matrix is 53 rows x 53 columns, and thus too large 
for inclusion here, but it is available upon request.  The original unaggregated IMPLAN data is 
available for purchase at https://implan.com/. 
 
APPENDIX E – EGYPTIAN SAM 
 
 The Egypt 2008 Social Accounting Matrix is 72 rows x 72 columns, and thus too large for 
inclusion here, but it is available upon request.  For I-O and supply-use matrices from CAPMAS 
for Nov. 2010 and Sept. 2008, visit http://www.capmas.gov.eg/pages_ar.aspx?pageid=1475. 
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